QUANTIFYING THE RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK by Heier, Mark I. & Morales, Angel J.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Theses and Dissertations 1. Thesis and Dissertation Collection, all items
2020-06
QUANTIFYING THE RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK
Heier, Mark I.; Morales, Angel J.
Monterey, CA; Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/65543
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United
States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the
United States.








QUANTIFYING THE RISK MANAGEMENT 
FRAMEWORK 
by 
Mark I. Heier and Angel J. Morales 
June 2020 
Thesis Advisor: Dan C. Boger 
Co-Advisor: Scot A. Miller 
 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE  Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing 
instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of 
information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions 
for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson 
Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project 
(0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503.




3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
Master’s thesis
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
QUANTIFYING THE RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK
5. FUNDING NUMBERS
6. AUTHOR(S) Mark I. Heier and Angel J. Morales












11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the
official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
A
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)
For the past thirty-five years the DOD/DON have worked diligently to address the 
exponentially increasing challenges that cyber security presents. While the current Risk Management 
Framework (RMF) approach improves upon its predecessors, it is once again in need of an overhaul. 
Derived from National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and DOD directives, the 
DON’s RMF process blindly inherited the ambiguity necessary for larger governing 
organizations, failing to tailor the RMF to specific Navy organizational needs and 
practices. The DON RMF is highly qualitative and lacks standardized definitions, measurements, 
metrics, and a risk assessment methodology. The qualitative approach of the current RMF is 
further complicated by the bias, heuristics, groupthink, inconsistency, overconfidence, 
and overestimation ensuing from subjective inputs manifested throughout the DON RMF. The 
DON RMF must have a more quantitative RMF consisting of standardized definitions, 
measurements, metrics, and better training to ensure risk is being measured and mitigated 
appropriately. These improvements would continuously provide feedback for process improvement, 
leading to increased cybersecurity and resiliency of naval networks. 
14. SUBJECT TERMS
Risk Management Framework, RMF, National Institute of Standards and Technology, 





















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) 
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18
i 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
ii 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
QUANTIFYING THE RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK 
Mark I. Heier 
Lieutenant, United States Navy 
BS, Strayer University, 2012 
Angel J. Morales 
Lieutenant, United States Navy 
BS, U.S. Naval Academy, 2013 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
MASTER OF SCIENCE IN NETWORK OPERATIONS AND TECHNOLOGY 
from the 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
June 2020 
Approved by: Dan C. Boger 
Advisor 
Scot A. Miller 
Co-Advisor 
Thomas J. Housel 
Chair, Department of Information Sciences 
iii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
iv 
ABSTRACT 
For the past thirty-five years the DOD/DON have worked diligently to address the 
exponentially increasing challenges that cyber security presents. While the current Risk 
Management Framework (RMF) approach improves upon its predecessors, it is once 
again in need of an overhaul. Derived from National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) and DOD directives, the DON’s RMF process blindly inherited the 
ambiguity necessary for larger governing organizations, failing to tailor the RMF to 
specific Navy organizational needs and practices. The DON RMF is highly qualitative 
and lacks standardized definitions, measurements, metrics, and a risk assessment 
methodology. The qualitative approach of the current RMF is further complicated by the 
bias, heuristics, groupthink, inconsistency, overconfidence, and overestimation ensuing 
from subjective inputs manifested throughout the DON RMF. The DON RMF must have 
a more quantitative RMF consisting of standardized definitions, measurements, metrics, 
and better training to ensure risk is being measured and mitigated appropriately. These 
improvements would continuously provide feedback for process improvement, leading to 
increased cybersecurity and resiliency of naval networks. 
v 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
vi 
vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................1
A. PROBLEM .................................................................................................1 
B. NEED FOR A QUANTITATIVE MODEL TO MEASURE
RISK ............................................................................................................2 
C. PURPOSE ...................................................................................................2 
D. METHODOLOGY AND STUDY DESIGN ............................................3 
1. Study Design and Implementation ...............................................3 
2. Scope and Limitations ...................................................................5 
3. The RMF Analysis .........................................................................5 
4. Research Questions and Hypothesis .............................................5 
E. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS ...............................................................6 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW .....................................................................................7 
A. RISK DEFINED .........................................................................................7 
1. Historical Assessment of Risk .......................................................7 
2. Definitions of Risk: General and Industry ..................................8 
3. Definitions of Risk, DOD, and DON.............................................9 
B. MEASUREMENT: METHODS, PURPOSE IN DON, AND
BENEFITS ..................................................................................................9 
1. Measurement Misunderstandings in Cybersecurity:
Concept, Object, and Methods .....................................................9 
2. Role of Performance Measurements in the DON .....................12 
3. The Benefits of Using Measurements .........................................13 
C. RISK MANAGEMENT METHODS .....................................................14 
1. Risk Assessment ...........................................................................15 
2. Qualitative, Quantitative, and Semi-quantitative
Approaches ...................................................................................15 
3. Risk Matrices ................................................................................17 
D. SUBJECTIVE INPUTS AND ESTIMATES .........................................23 
1. Subjectivity ...................................................................................23 
2. Calibration Applied to SMEs......................................................23 
3. Overconfidence, Overestimation, and Inconsistency ................24 
4. Heuristics ......................................................................................28 
5. Bias ................................................................................................31 
6. Group Dynamics ..........................................................................34 
E. CHAPTER CONCLUSION ....................................................................34 
viii 
III. RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK (RMF) .............................................37 
A. CURRENT DON RMF PROCESS ........................................................39 
1. RMF Step One: Categorize System ............................................40 
2. RMF Step Two: Select Security Controls ..................................42 
3. RMF Step Three: Implement Security Controls .......................43 
4. RMF Step Four: Assess Security Controls ................................43 
5. RMF Step Five: Authorize System .............................................44 
6. RMF Step Six: Continuous Monitoring .....................................45 
B. CHAPTER CONCLUSION ....................................................................46 
IV. ANALYSIS ...........................................................................................................47 
A. STANDARD RISK DEFINITION .........................................................47 
B. STANDARD MEASUREMENT METHODS .......................................48 
C. QUALITATIVE VERSUS QUANTITATIVE ......................................49 
D. DON RMF PROCESS .............................................................................50 
1. RMF Step Zero: Prepare .............................................................51 
2. RMF Step One: Categorize System ............................................51 
3. RMF Step Two: Select Security Controls ..................................51 
4. RMF Step Three: Implement Security Controls .......................52 
5. RMF Step Four: Assess Security Controls ................................52 
6. RMF Step Five: Authorize System .............................................53 
7. RMF Step Six: Monitor Security Controls ................................54 
E. NAVY-WIDE CHALLENGES LIMITING RMF ................................55 
1. Culture ..........................................................................................55 
2. People ............................................................................................56 
3. Structure .......................................................................................59 
4. Process ...........................................................................................60 
5. Resources ......................................................................................62 
F. CHAPTER CONCLUSION ....................................................................63 
V. RECOMMENDATIONS .....................................................................................65 
A. SUMMARY ..............................................................................................65 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS .........................................................................66 
1. Get the Basics Right .....................................................................66 
2. DON RMF Process .......................................................................70 
3. Navy-Wide Challenges that Limit RMF ....................................77 
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY .........................................................80 
LIST OF REFERENCES ................................................................................................83 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ...................................................................................93 
ix 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Assessment Scale – Level of Risk (Combination of Likelihood and 
Impact). Source: NIST SP 800-30 (2012, p. I-1). ......................................18 
Figure 2. Risk (Combination of Likelihood and Impact). Source: DOD RMF 
KS, https://rmfks.osd.mil/rmf/RMFImplementation/AssessControls/
Pages/ResidualRisk.aspx (accessed 2020). ................................................19 
Figure 3. Example of a Risk Matrix with Numbers and Color Codes. Source: 
Ibtida and Pamungkas (2018). ...................................................................19 
Figure 4. Assessment Scale – Level of Risk. Source: NIST SP 800-30 (2012, 
p. I-2)..........................................................................................................20 
Figure 5. Expert Estimates of Risk Probability for Application Parts and 
Components. Source: Ramler and Felderer, (2013, p. 95). ........................26 
Figure 6. Estimated Risk Probability vs. Actual Risk Exposure. Source: 
Ramler and Felderer, (2013, p. 96). ...........................................................27 
Figure 7. Navy RMF Process Overview. Source: Barrett (2017). ............................40 
Figure 8. RMF Step One – System Categorization. Source: Barrett (2017). ............41 
Figure 9. RMF System Categorization Impact Values. Source: Miller, 
Kiriakou, and Hilton (2015). ......................................................................41 
Figure 10. RMF Step Two – Select Security Controls. Source: Barrett (2017). ........42 
Figure 11. RMF Step Three – Implement Security Controls. Source: Barrett 
(2017). ........................................................................................................43 
Figure 12. RMF Step Four – Assess Security Controls. Source: Barrett (2017). .......44 
Figure 13. RMF Step Five – Authorize System. Source: Barrett (2017). ...................45 
Figure 14. RMF Step Six – Continuous Monitoring. Source: Barrett (2017). ............46 
Figure 15. Circular Loops within DON, DOD, and NIST Governing RMF 
Documentation. ..........................................................................................60 
x 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
xi 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Examples of Standard Quantified Measures ..............................................69 
Table 2. Examples of ISSE Performance Metrics for Consistency .........................72 
Table 3. Examples of NQV, SCA Liaison, SCA Performance Metrics for 
Consistency ................................................................................................74 
Table 4. Examples of AO Performance Metrics for Consistency ............................75 
  
xii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
xiii 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
A&A    Assessment & Accreditation  
AI    Artificial Intelligence  
AO   Authorizing Official 
AOR   Area of Responsibility 
ATO    Authority to Operate  
C   Compliant 
C2C24   Compile to Combat in Twenty-Four (Hours)  
C&A   Certification and Accreditation 
CBT   Computer-based Training 
CCRI   Command Cyber Readiness Inspection 
CCORI  Command Cyber Operational Readiness Inspection 
CIO    Chief Information Officer  
CISQ    Consortium for IT Software Quality  
CJCS   Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
COVID-19  Coronavirus Disease 2019 
CNO    Chief of Naval Operations  
CNSS   Committee on National Security Systems 
CNSSI   Committee on National Security Systems Instruction 
COA   Course of Action 
CSG   Carrier Strike Group 
CSI   Cyber Security Inspection 
CSICP   Cyber Security Inspection and Certification Program 
CTN   Cryptologic Technician Networks 
CTO   Computer Tasking Orders  
DC3I   DOD Cybersecurity Culture and Compliance Initiative 
DESRON  Destroyer Squadron 
DIACAP  Department of Defense Information Assurance `Certification and 
Accreditation Process  
 
xiv 
DII   Defense Information Infrastructure 
DITPR   Department of Defense Information Technology Record 
DITSCAP  Department of Defense Information Technology Certification and 
Accreditation Process  
DOD    Department of Defense  
DoDI   Department of Defense Instruction 
DON    Department of the Navy  
eMASS   Enterprise Mission Assurance Support Service  
FCC   Fleet Cyber Command 
FISMA   Federal Information Security Management Act  
GIG   Global Information Grid 
GPEA   Government Paperwork and Elimination Act 
GPRA   Government Performance and Results Act 
IA    Information Assurance  
IPCC   Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Control 
ISACA  Information System Audit and Control Association 
ISCM    Information Security Continuous Monitoring  
IS   Information System 
ISO   International Organization for Standardization 
ISO   Information System Owner 
ISSE   Information System Security Engineer 
IT   Information Technology or Information Systems Technician 
IV&V   Identify Verify and Validate 
KS   Knowledge Service 
LP-HC   Low Probability/High-Consequence 
MBSE   Model Based Systems Engineering  
ML   Machine Learning 
NASA   National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NATOPS  Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures 
NAVWAR  Naval Information Warfare Systems Command 
NC   Non-Compliant 
xv 
NCDOC  Navy Cyber Defense Operations Command 
NIST    National Institute of Standards and Technology  
NMCI   Navy/Marine Corps Intranet 
NOC   Network Operations Center 
NQV   Navy Qualified Validator 
OPNAV  Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 
PHIBRON  Amphibious Squadron 
PM   Program Manager 
POA&M  Plan of Actions and Milestones 
PPSM   Ports, Protocols, Services Management 
PSO   Package Submitting Officer 
RAISED RMF Rapid Assess and Incorporate for Software Engineering in a 
Day 
RAR   Risk Assessment Report 
RMF    Risk Management Framework  
SAP    Security Assessment Plan  
SAR   Security Assessment Report 
SCA   Security Control Assessor 
SDLC   Software Development Life Cycle 
SECDEF  Secretary of Defense 
SECDEVOPS  Security and Development Operations  
SECNAV  Secretary of the Navy 
SME    Subject Matter Expert  
SP   Security Plan 
SP   Special Publication 
SPAWAR   Space and Naval Warfare Systems  
SSP   System Security Plan 
SYSCOM  Systems Commands 
TFCA   Task Force Cyber Awakening 
TTP   Tactics Techniques and Procedures 
UNSECNAV  Under Secretary of the Navy 
xvi 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
xvii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
We would like to first thank our families: Sarah Morales, Alexandria Heier, 
and children, Roman and Elliana Heier, for their unwavering support throughout our 
naval careers and completion of our master’s degrees. 
Next, we want to thank our thesis advisors, Dr. Dan Boger and Scot Miller, for their 
expertise and guidance throughout the thesis writing process. We would also like to thank 
several experts who graciously provided their time and subject-matter expertise, allowing 
us to learn a great deal about the DON RMF Process. Bill Denham, Manfred Koethe, and 
the entire NAVWAR 5.8 team, we will forever be grateful for your support.  
Lastly, we would like to thank Alison Scharmota, from the Graduate Writing 
Center, and Carla Orvis Hunt, our editor, for reviewing our thesis, assisting us with 
improving our writing skills, and helping to elevate our thesis to a whole new level.  
xviii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
For the past thirty-five years, the Department of Defense (DOD) and the 
Department of the Navy (DON) have worked diligently to address the exponentially 
increasing challenges that cyber security presents. A pivotal part of information security is 
the assessment of risk. Is a system safe generally? What are its vulnerabilities? The 
assessment of potential events is vital to the Navy. While the current Risk Management 
Framework (RMF) approach improves upon its predecessors, it may again require an 
overhaul. Derived from National Institute of Standard and Technology (NIST) and DOD 
directives, the DON’s RMF process blindly inherited the ambiguity necessary for larger 
governing organizations, failing to tailor the RMF to specific Navy organizational needs 
and practices. The DON RMF is highly qualitative, lacking standardized definitions, 
measurements, metrics, and risk assessment methodologies. The qualitative approach of 
the current RMF is further complicated by bias, heuristics, group think, inconsistency, 
overconfidence, and overestimation ensuing from subjective inputs manifested throughout 
the DON RMF. The DON needs a more quantitative RMF consisting of standardized 
definitions, measurements, metrics, and better training to ensure risk is being measured and 
mitigated appropriately, in order to continuously provide feedback for process 
improvement, leading to increased cybersecurity and resiliency of naval networks. 
A. PROBLEM 
The current DON RMF is highly qualitative and lacks standardized definitions, 
measurements, metrics, and a risk assessment methodology. The qualitative nature of DON 
RMF is further complicated as subjective inputs are used throughout various parts of its 
process. These inputs are generally in the form of subjective verbal statements, risk 
matrices, color coding, and other communications that may introduce errors via bias, 
heuristics, group think, inconsistency and overconfidence or overestimation of risk into the 
assessment (Bazerman & Moore, 2013; Fischhoff, 1982; Hubbard, 2009; Hubbard & 
Seiersen, 2016; Kahneman, 2011; Klipstein, 2017). Often, risk matrices have embedded 
subjective inputs that become embedded into other risk matrices. At a minimum, risk 
2 
matrices have several areas of concern including: a lack of standardization and meaning, 
range compression, the presumption of regular intervals, and the addition of mathematical 
errors and inconsistencies (Ball & Watt; 2013; Cox, 2008; Hubbard, 2009; Hubbard & 
Seiersen, 2016; Klipstein, 2017; Levine, 2012; Peace, 2017). Worse, no evidence exists 
that the use of risk matrices reduces risk or improves risk management decisions. In fact, 
the current DON Cyber Security Review of 2019 highlighted that the current approach to 
cyber security and risk management shows evidence to the contrary. Although there have 
been numerous recent pushes to make RMF and cyber security faster, such as Compile to 
Combat in 24 Hours (C2C24) and RMF Rapid Assess and Incorporate for Software 
Engineering in a Day (RAISED), the DON needs to reprioritize its efforts to accurately 
account for risk.  
B. NEED FOR A QUANTITATIVE MODEL TO MEASURE RISK 
The current DON RMF process depends on many variables and uncertainties. 
Additionally, without a standardized risk assessment model, the resulting approach to risk 
varies within DON organizations. Without standardization, each DON organization ends 
up making subjective estimates of risk that can vary widely due to individual bias, 
heuristics, groupthink, and overconfidence. A quantitative risk assessment would not 
immunize risk approaches from subjectivity; however, quantitative approaches better 
account for subjectivity while qualitative risk models do not (Hubbard & Seiersen, 2016). 
The DOD and DON do not have a standardized risk model, terminology, approach, or 
means of measuring success. The DON needs a quantitative, multi-criteria risk model that 
accounts for the aforementioned issues and concerns arising from subjective inputs and 
risk matrices. At a minimum, a more quantitative model would help reduce uncertainty. 
Especially in cyber security, even a small reduction of uncertainty can yield significant 
results (Hubbard & Seiersen, 2016). While the scope of this research pertains to the DON 
specifically, many of the findings are also be applicable to the DOD as a whole. 
C. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this study is to analyze the current DON RMF process, risk 
definitions, approaches, and measurements; to identify potential areas of improvement; and 
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to propose well-documented, effective risk management methods for immediate 
consideration within the DON RMF. Because the DON’s current RMF process does not 
contain a means to maintain pace with the ever-changing cyber security landscape and to 
keep the overall risk manageable, this thesis identifies issues within the RMF and provides 
a strategy for reducing information system security risk, improving decision-making, and 
growing operational cyber resiliency.  
D. METHODOLOGY AND STUDY DESIGN 
We use a qualitative-based research method emphasizing literature review, case 
studies, and subject matter expert interviews. Our research examines the need for more 
quantitative approaches and measurements of risk management aimed at effectiveness 
rather than compliance within the RMF process. 
1. Study Design and Implementation 
 We include comprehensive examination of the Risk Management Framework in 
our research’s qualitative methodology, including examining how the DON defines and 
measures risks. In various forms of research from April 2019 to March 2020, we studied 
the following areas: 
• Classroom study in pertinent subjects such as Secure Management of 
Systems, Cyber Security Incident Response and Recovery, Information 
Sciences for Defense, Computer-based Tools for Decision Support, and 
Technology Enabled Process Improvement (CS3670, CS4684, IS3001, 
IS3301, IS4220)  
This instruction provided a baseline knowledge on strategy and policy governing the DOD 
as well as technology and tools utilized in support of Cyber Resiliency.  
• Interviews and conversations with Subject Matter Experts (SME) in the fields 
of Cyber Resiliency, Risk Management Framework, Security Controls, Model 
Based Systems Engineering (MBSE), and Software Engineering  
4 
• Attendance at the Consortium for Information & Software Quality (CISQ) 
Cyber Resilience Summit in Washington, DC, in October 2019.  
This annual summit is convened to brief Federal and State IT leaders and policymakers 
regarding standards and best practices for measuring risk and quality in software. Various 
government and industry leaders presented and facilitated panel discussions reinforcing the 
need to apply proven standards and methodologies that reduce risk and assist in meeting 
the objectives for acquiring, developing, and sustaining secure and reliable systems.  
• Numerous site visits to Naval Information Warfare Systems Command 
(NAVWAR) in San Diego, California to meet with leading SMEs directly 
supporting RMF and its processes within the Department of the Navy 
• Case study analysis of qualitative and quantitative measures and approaches to 
RMF within the Department of Defense and leading industry members.  
These case studies allow for the juxtaposition of qualitative versus quantitative methods, 
highlight advantages and disadvantages, and reinforce the need for an approach to RMF 
that includes valuable aspects of both.  
• Case study analysis of cognitive psychology and its effects on the thought 
process in decision-making  
These case studies identified the numerous challenges and considerations associated with 
subjective inputs and interpretations while highlighting its impacts in qualitative and 
quantitative methods and addressing the methods and considerations to mitigating these 
challenges. 
• Case study analysis of risk matrices and their impacts within multiple 
industries ranging from insurance, financial, safety, oil and gas, and cyber 
security.  
These case studies allow for examination of the effectiveness of risk matrices within 
various fields along with challenges and outcomes associated with their usage while 
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additionally providing recommendations and rules when risk matrices must be used within 
certain organizations. 
2. Scope and Limitations 
 While the RMF is a DOD-wide program, this thesis specifically focuses on how to 
improve the RMF within the DON. Our methodology included researching current 
definitions and measurements of risk within the DOD, DON, and leading members of 
industry to evaluate the current RMF within the DON, to identify deficiencies, and to 
recommend improvements. In 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic restricted our ability to 
travel specifically to conduct an in-depth analysis of Authority to Operate (ATO) packages, 
a highly recommended step for future researchers.  
3. The RMF Analysis 
The preceding methodology informed a deep understanding of the DON’s 
definition and measurement of risk. This thesis hypothesizes that the DON’s RMF is 
qualitative, focused on compliance rather than effectiveness, and that more quantitative 
measures would better ensure cyber resiliency.  
We conducted extensive risk management research via case studies throughout 
various fields to correlate challenges that persist across the fields as well as key mitigation 
methods and ingredients for success. The case studies allowed the identification of 
common mistakes and fallacies within risk management that are widely applicable across 
industries to include the DON, RMF, and cyber security.  
We compared our findings to the DON RMF process and consulted SMEs within 
the DON RMF. Through these consultations, we confirmed issues within the RMF and 
filled information gaps between the research and our interpretations. 
4. Research Questions and Hypothesis 
1. How does DON define risk (cyber)? 
2. How does industry define risk (cyber)? 
3. How does DON measure risk? 
6 
4. How does industry measure risk? 
5. Does RMF adequately support cyber resiliency? 
Hypothesis: The current state of the RMF is not at a sufficient level to deal with the 
emerging real-world threats that are posed via cyber security. The DON’s approach to risk 
management is a more qualitative approach focused on compliance rather than 
effectiveness. Examining successful risk management solutions, we will propose potential, 
effective risk management methods and metrics for immediate consideration within DON 
RMF. 
E. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
Chapter I introduces the RMF, the problem and purpose of the research, the 
methodology and study design, and thesis objectives. Chapter II reviews literature that 
defines risk and examines potential advantages and disadvantages of the various risk 
measurement methods and metrics. Chapter III provides step-by-step analysis of the DON 
RMF, and Chapter IV analyzes the DON RMF in light of Chapter II’s best practices. Last, 




II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 A Risk Management Framework (RMF) ideally assures information systems 
security through a process that identifies, selects, and verifies requirements for system 
authorization while continuously monitoring said conditions throughout the system life 
cycle. While the first chapter discussed potential problems within the DON RMF current 
process, Chapter II’s review of the literature examines underlying components of the RMF 
and how they interact. The chapter does so in four main sections followed by a conclusion: 
first, it defines risk; second, it details underlying principles of methods and measurement 
and various benefits; third, it analyzes potential advantages and disadvantages of current 
risk management methods; and, fourth, it examines underlying facets of subjective inputs 
and estimates and ways to mitigate subjectivity. 
A. RISK DEFINED 
What is risk? While a firefighter might assess running into a burning building 
differently than would a schoolteacher assess walking into a school, the concept of risk 
shares a common denominator across industries: the potential for loss and how to mitigate 
it. Add to the general objective of avoiding loss the significant challenge for 
decisionmakers who need to balance multiple objectives (Klipstein, 2017), and risk 
assessment grows more complex. The following sections provide a historical overview and 
definitions. 
1. Historical Assessment of Risk 
Humans have long sought to manage risk to avoid hazards or reduce loss. We found 
the earliest example emerging around 3000 BC when Chinese merchants began spreading 
their cargo around multiple vessels to minimize potential losses (Vazzano Ltd, n.d.). 
Around the same time, Babylonians sold insurance in the form of bottomry contracts 
(Greene, 2018). Under such contracts, merchants would receive loans that would convert 
to grants if the shipment sunk under the provision that the interest on the loan offset the 
insurance risk (Greene, 2018). Later, the Hindus in 600 BC and the Greeks in 400 BC 
continued this practice (Greene, 2018). Insurance contracts grew rapidly through the Greek 
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and Roman eras, more so as trade and financial activities expanded in Europe in the late 
Middle Ages, and even further once the Americas entered the picture (Roggi & Altman, 
2013). The growing need for insurance created a demand for means to calculate risk, and 
in 1494, mathematician Luca Pacioli began his work based off of gambling chances (Roggi 
& Altman, 2013). Several additional scholars continued toward a probabilistic calculus that 
could help assess event probability. Particularly, Daniel and Jacob Bernoulli provided two 
powerful theoretical improvements: the law of large numbers, which argued that averages 
obtained during large trials of random variables were more likely to be accurate than those 
obtained during smaller trials and “subjective elements (risk aversion) in the theory of 
choice under uncertainty” (Roggi & Altman, 2013, p. 7). Research expanded while these 
core elements remain the basis of risk assessment approaches today. 
2. Definitions of Risk: General and Industry 
While etymologists debate whether risk can be traced back to the Spanish risco, “a 
pointed, sharp rock” or “dangerous for navigation,” the Latin resecare, “to cut,” or the 
Arab ritz, “all that is necessary to live” (Roggi & Altman, 2013), in simple terms, the word 
risk primarily means the potential for a negative consequence to occur.  
Leading industry organizations often influence the development of DOD/DON 
frameworks; however, industry leaders have more than one universal definition of risk. 
The Information Systems Audit and Control Association (ISACA) defines risk as “the 
combination of the probability of an event and its impact” (ISACA, n.d.). The International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO) defines risk as “the combination of the probability 
or frequency of occurrence of an event and the magnitude of its consequence” 
(International Organization for Standardization, 2009). The national leader in standards 
development, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), defines risk as 
“a measure of the extent to which an entity is threatened by a potential circumstance or 
event, and typically a function of: (i) the adverse impacts that would arise if the 
circumstance or event occurs; and (ii) the likelihood of occurrence” (NIST, 2012, p. 69). 
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3. Definitions of Risk, DOD, and DON 
Different DOD organizations also utilize varying definitions of risk. The 
Department of Defense Risk, Issue, and Opportunity Management Guide for Defense 
Acquisition Programs defines risk as: “a potential future event or condition that may have 
a negative effect on achieving program objectives for cost, schedule, and performance. 
Risks are defined by (1) the probability (greater than 0, less than 1) of an undesired event 
or condition and (2) the consequences, impact, or severity of the undesired event, were it 
to occur.” (Department of Defense, [DOD], 2017, p. 78). The Committee on National 
Security Systems (CNSS) Publication 4009 glossary defines risk as: “a measure of the 
extent to which an entity is threatened by a potential circumstance or event, and typically 
a function of: (i) the adverse impacts that would arise if the circumstance or event occurs; 
and (ii) the likelihood of occurrence” (Committee on National Security Systems, 2015, p. 
104). 
B. MEASUREMENT: METHODS, PURPOSE IN DON, AND BENEFITS 
In the context of cyber security, some SMEs argue that some things simply cannot 
be measured, yet we know measurement serves a purpose for the Navy and offers benefits. 
Hubbard and Seiersen (2016) posit a series of misunderstandings about measurement 
methods, what is being measured, and even the definition of measurement itself. This 
section examines those misunderstandings, including Hubbard and Seiersen’s three reasons 
for the common misconception that certain things within cybersecurity and information 
security are immeasurable: concept of measurement, object of measurement, and methods 
of measurement. The section then examines the role of performance measurements in the 
Navy and several benefits of using measurements. 
1. Measurement Misunderstandings in Cybersecurity: Concept, Object, 
and Methods 
Definition confusion and variance can give a false appearance of immeasurability. 
The concept of measurement has various interpretations because the definition of 
measurement appears to be widely misunderstood. Our research did not yield a definition 
or application of measurement in DOD or DON literature pertaining to RMF; for purposes 
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of this thesis research, we adopted the proposed definition from Hubbard and Seiersen 
(2016, p. 21) “a quantitatively expressed reduction of uncertainty based on one or more 
observations.” However, since DON RMF is derived from the NIST RMF, it is important 
to examine the how measurement is defined by NIST. NIST SP-800-55 Revision 1 (p. 9) 
defines measurement as “the process of data collection, analysis, and reporting.” Similarly, 
the object of measurement is not well-defined further complicating the ability to provide 
accurate measurements. More complications occur when objects are defined with loose and 
ambiguous language (Hubbard & Seiersen, 2016). Using well-defined and understood 
measurements facilitates proper communication regarding the purpose of the measure.  
The examination illuminates several other measurement components that support 
decision-making. For example, according to NIST (2008), there are three areas for 
measurement: implementation, efficiency/effectiveness, and impact. NIST (2008, p. 13) 
defines measuring implementation as measures “used to demonstrate progress in 
implementing information security programs, specific security controls, and associated 
policies and procedures.” Although numerous types of measures can be used concurrently, 
the information security (IS) measures shift as the IS program matures (NIST, 2008). 
According to NIST (2008), once all controls, policies, and plans are implemented, 
measurements will shift towards effectiveness/efficiency and impact. The purpose of 
effectiveness/efficiency measures are to track whether program-level processes and 
systems-level security controls are correctly implemented, operated, and meet the desired 
outcome based on risk assessment results. The purpose of measuring impact is to 
communicate the effect that information security has on the organization’s mission. This 
varies by organization but is utilized to quantify countless mission-related impacts of 
information security such as effects on cost, public trust, and many others.  
Often, many objects believed to be unmeasurable are not only measurable but 
perhaps have already been measured (Hubbard & Seiersen, 2016), and unfamiliarity with 
methods of measurement can complicate the situation. Often, cybersecurity experts are 
unfamiliar with many procedures of empirical observation (Hubbard & Seiersen, 2016). 
Requirements specified for calculating measurements by NIST are measures that “yield 
quantifiable information for comparison purposes, apply formulas for analysis, and track 
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changes using the same points of reference” (NIST, 2008, p. 9). Commonly, cybersecurity 
experts use percentages or averages or sometimes absolute numbers, depending on the 
activity they are measuring (NIST, 2008). Most agree that data is necessary to support 
quantifiable performance measurements. NIST (2008) recommends considering the 
following when searching for data to calculate performance measures: 
• Data for calculating measures must be readily available, and the process needs 
to be measurable; 
• Processes must be consistent and repeatable to be considered for 
measurement; 
• Even in repeatable and stable processes, measurable data might be difficult to 
obtain if they are not well documented; and 
• Easily obtainable data should be used to reduce the resource burden on the 
organization (NIST, 2008, p. viii). 
NIST recommends that the information security activities used to provide quantifiable data 
for conducting measurements are risk assessments, security assessments, penetration 
testing, and continuous monitoring (NIST, 2008). The effectiveness of training and 
awareness programs is also quantifiable and is listed as a successful trait employed by 
Fortune 500 companies (SECNAV, 2019). 
Although NIST emphasizes measurement data being easily obtainable, Hubbard 
and Seiersen propose additional considerations. Hubbard and Seiersen (2016) believe that 
individuals claiming that cybersecurity lacks ample amounts of data to conduct quality 
statistical measurements are generally math-phobic managers and that, in reality, there is 
more data to measure than one might think. Two examples are using data from other 
organizations or systems, even if not completely identical to ours, and measuring system 
components or the whole system (Hubbard & Seiersen, 2016). Hubbard and Seiersen 
(2016) describe various scenarios such as: How else would a doctor know that a drug that 
their patient never tried might help them? How can an insurance company estimate 
someone’s health if they have never made a claim? How can an engineer predict a system’s 
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behavior that has not been built yet? Statistics and science would be much easier if 
everything measured could be directly seen, but most measurements that would be 
considered “hard” involve indirect deductions and inferences (Hubbard & Seiersen, 2016). 
These concepts also apply to cybersecurity as system details are derived from many 
different data sources that include embedded, unseen components (Hubbard & Seiersen 
2016). 
2. Role of Performance Measurements in the DON
Regulatory, financial, and organizational reasons drive the requirement to measure 
information security performance (NIST, 2008). Researchers can use performance 
measures to support internal improvement efforts, linking information security programs 
to agency level strategic planning efforts (NIST, 2008). For the DON, a number of existing 
rules, regulations, and laws mention performance measurement generally and Information 
Security specifically, including the Clinger-Cohen Act, the Government Performance and 
Results Act (GPRA), the Government Paperwork Elimination Act (GPEA) and the Federal 
Information Security Management Act (FISMA) (NIST, 2008). According to NIST (2008), 
the following factors must be considered during the development and implementation of 
an information security measurement program: 
• Measures must yield quantifiable information (percentages, averages, and
numbers);
• Data that supports the measures needs to be readily obtainable;
• Only repeatable information security processes should be considered for
measurement; and
• Measures must be useful for tracking performance and directing resources
(NIST, 2008, p. viii).
NIST SP 800-55 Revision 1, Performance Measurement Guide for Information 
Security, “expands upon NIST’s previous work in the field of information security 
measures to provide additional program level guidelines for quantifying information 
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security performance in support of an organization’s strategic goals” (NIST, 2008, p. 1). 
The security controls identified in NIST SP 800-53, Security and Privacy Controls for 
Federal Information Systems and Organizations, serve as the foundation to develop 
measurements that support the evaluation of information security programs. Additionally, 
NIST SP 800-30, Guide for Conducting Risk Assessments, and NIST SP 800-53 are relied 
upon for supporting quantifiable performance results (NIST, 2008). NIST (2008, p. viii) 
states that “these measures indicate the effectiveness of security controls applied to 
information systems and in support of information security programs. Such measures can 
facilitate risk-based decision-making, improve performance, and increase accountability 
through the collection, analysis, and reporting of relevant performance related data” (NIST, 
2008, p. 1). This allows “the implementation, efficiency, and effectiveness” of an 
information system and its security controls to be tied to an agency achieving mission 
success (NIST, 2008, p. 1). 
The most recent review of Cyber Security within the DON highlighted a need for 
RMF and cyber security performance measurements (SECNAV, 2019). The 2019 review 
of the Cyber Security posture within the DON discovered a “lack of means to adequately 
measure or even estimate the cost or value of items at risk,” which inhibits “the ability to 
provide justification for investments in this area” (SECNAV, 2019, p. 12). This suggests 
that the aforementioned NIST publications are not as useful as they should be. 
3. The Benefits of Using Measurements 
Performance measurements provide key organizational benefits including: 
“increased accountability, improved information security effectiveness, simplified 
compliance demonstration, and quantified inputs for resource allocation decisions” (NIST, 
2008, pp. 10–11). Utilizing measures that determine if specific security controls are 
implemented incorrectly, are ineffective, or are not implemented at all, in addition to 
tracking personnel responsible for implementing those security controls increases 
accountability (NIST, 2008). Information security effectiveness improves through the 
quantification of progress toward: organizational goals and objectives; information 
security processes, procedures, and security controls implemented; and comparing real-
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world activities and events (i.e., data breaches, server downtime, etc.) (NIST, 2008). 
Compliance is easier to demonstrate by having performance measures in place and readily 
available, which also reduces data collection time.  
One of the most compelling benefits of performance measurements is the ability to 
provide quantifiable inputs for resource allocation decisions. With government and the 
DON operating on a reduced budget due to fiscal constraints and market conditions, it can 
be difficult to justify investments into information security. The usage of “information 
security measures” supports “risk-based decision-making by contributing quantifiable 
inputs to the risk management process” (NIST, 2008, p. 11). This directly allows 
organizations to measure their successes or failures of “information security investments 
while providing quantifiable data to support resource allocation for risk-based decisions” 
and investments, which yields the best value from available resources (NIST, 2008, p. 11). 
Measurements provide many organizational benefits and ultimately aim to improve 
knowledge through observation-based uncertainty reductions about a quantity that is 
relevant to a decision (Hubbard, 2009). To observe any measurement, a baseline must be 
established, and benchmarks must be set for success to be measured (NIST, 2008). This is 
particularly difficult for an organization like the DON where success is not measured in 
money, but in the far more nebulous concept of security. 
Therefore, the Navy has a crucial need to set performance targets to assist with 
measurements. Performance targets are a critical component when defining “information 
security measures as they will establish the benchmark by which success is measured” 
(NIST, 2008, p. 30). NIST (2008, p. 30) states that “setting performance targets for 
effectiveness, efficiency, and impact measures is much more complex as management will 
need to apply qualitative and subjective reasoning to determine the appropriate levels of 
security effectiveness and efficiency for benchmark performance.” 
C. RISK MANAGEMENT METHODS 
While several different risk management methodologies exist, they all propose to 
identify risk and reduce it to an acceptable level. This research focuses on the means of 
identifying those risks, aiming to analyze qualitative and quantitative risk management 
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methods within the DON RMF. Considering that risks are not always readily apparent, 
identifying those risks and their sources as early as possible is crucial. The following three 
sections examine three underpinnings of risk management: risk assessment; qualitative, 
quantitative, and semi-quantitative approaches; and the special problems of risk matrices.  
1. Risk Assessment
Risk assessment is a fundamental component of an organizational risk management 
process as described in NIST SP 800-39. Risk assessments “identify, estimate, and 
prioritize risk to organizational operations (i.e., mission, functions, image, reputation), 
organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, and the nation, resulting from the 
operation and use of information systems” (NIST, 2012, p. 1). According to NIST SP 
800-30 (2012, p. 1),
The purpose of risk assessments is to inform decisionmakers and support 
risk mitigations by identifying: (i) relevant threats to organizations or 
threats directed through organizations against other organizations; (ii) 
vulnerabilities both internal and external to organizations; (iii) impact (i.e., 
harm) to organizations that may occur given the potential for threats 
exploiting vulnerabilities; and (iv) likelihood that harm will occur.  
Determination of risk is the end result of a risk assessment (“i.e., typically a function of the 
degree of harm and likelihood of harm occurring”) (NIST, 2012, p. 1).  
Risk assessments “are conducted at all three tiers in the risk management hierarchy: 
Tier 1 (organization level), Tier 2 (mission/business process level), and Tier 3 (information 
system level)” (NIST, 2012, p. ix). For example, at Tiers 1 and 2, “organizations use risk 
assessments to evaluate systemic information security-related risks associated with 
organizational governance and management activities, mission/business processes, 
enterprise architecture, or the funding of information security programs” (NIST, 2012, p. 
1). At Tier 3, “organizations use risk assessments to more effectively support the 
implementation of the Risk Management Framework” (NIST, 2012, p. 1).  
2. Qualitative, Quantitative, and Semi-quantitative Approaches
There are several avenues to approach risk assessment, based on three standard 
approaches: qualitative, quantitative, and semi-quantitative. NIST SP 800-30 (2012) and 
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Rot (2008) discuss qualitative, quantitative, and semi-quantitative approaches to risk 
management, each having specific advantages and disadvantages. The selected approach 
may vary based on the culture of an organization and their attitude towards the notion of 
uncertainty and risk communication (NIST, 2012). NIST SP 800-39, Managing 
Information Security Risk: Organization, Mission, and Information System View, states 
that a risk assessment is a key component of “a holistic, organization-wide risk 
management process” (NIST, 2011, p. 6). A risk management process includes: (i) framing 
risk; (ii) assessing risk; (iii) responding to risk; and (iv) monitoring risk (NIST, 2012,  
pp. 33–45).  
Qualitative risk assessments generally utilize non-numeric principles, rules, or 
scoring methods to categorize risk levels by terms such as high, moderate, or low (NIST, 
2012). Qualitative risk assessments easily communicate results to decisionmakers (NIST, 
2012). Additionally, they allow risks to be prioritized in order, determining areas with 
greater risk in less time and for less money (Rot, 2008). Disadvantages of qualitative risk 
assessments include “disallowance of determination of probabilities and results using 
numerical measures, cost-benefit analyses being more difficult during the selection of 
protections, and the results achieved having general characters or approximations since 
rankings are using an ordinal based measuring system” (Rot, 2008, p. 2). 
Additionally, with the small range values common to qualitative risk assessments—
low, moderate, or high—it becomes more difficult to prioritize and compare reported risks 
(NIST, 2012). NIST SP 800-30 states that, “unless each value is clearly defined or 
characterized, different experts, relying on their individual experiences, could produce 
significantly divergent assessment results” (NIST, 2012, p. 14). Thus, qualitative risk 
assessments leave room for ambiguity and subjectivity in the overall determination of risk. 
Quantitative risk assessments utilize numerical principles, rules, or methods to 
estimate risk based on available data (NIST, 2012). The data could be defined in amounts, 
frequency of threat occurrences, or susceptibility by probable loss value, all of which allow 
for numerical definitions to estimate the probability of a risk occurrence and whether the 
potential consequence is acceptable (Rot, 2008). Quantitative risk assessments, therefore, 
effectively support the cost-benefit analysis of alternate risk responses or courses of action 
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(COA) (NIST, 2012; Rot, 2008) and gives a more accurate risk picture (Rot, 2008). 
However, disadvantages include imprecision and confusion with analysis results, lessened 
accuracy of results influenced by subjective determination, and outweighed benefits 
affected by cost, expert experience, and analysis tools (NIST, 2012; Rot, 2008). Hubbard 
& Seiersen (2016) believe that a quantitative approach is best for conducting risk 
assessments including in the cyber security field. 
Combining benefits from both qualitative and quantitative risk assessments, semi-
quantitative risk assessments utilize a set of principles, rules, or methods to estimate risk 
with bins, scales, or representative numbers from which their values and definitions are not 
defined in other contexts (NIST, 2012). Examples could be bins (e.g., 0–15, 16–35, 36–70, 
71–85, 86–100) or scales (e.g., 1–10) (NIST, 2012). This combination allows for easier 
translation into qualitative communications for decisionmakers and value comparisons 
within the same bin or separate bins (NIST, 2012). Disadvantages include lessening 
accuracy of results with subjective determinations, poorly defined bin ranges, and experts 
relying on their individual experiences, which could produce inconsistent assessment 
results (NIST, 2012). 
3. Risk Matrices
Many times, the information required to support the quantification or measurement 
of risk appears lacking or hard to obtain, resulting in the search for a qualitative approach 
(Hubbard, 2009; Hubbard & Seiersen, 2016; Wall, 2011), often leading to the use of risk 
matrices to support a qualitative approach (Hubbard & Seiersen, 2016).  
A popular risk-assessment/risk-management methodology tool utilized by a wide 
array of public, private, and government organizations, risk matrices may even be 
considered by some as a best practice. Markowski and Mannan (2008, p. 152) define a risk 
matrix as “a mechanism to characterize and rank process risks that are typically identified 
through one or more multifunctional reviews (e.g., process hazard analysis, audits, or 
incident investigation).” Cox (2008, p. 497) defines a risk matrix as “a table that has several 
categories of ‘probability,’ ‘likelihood,’ or ‘frequency’ for its rows (or columns) and 
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several categories of ‘severity,’ ‘impact,’ or ‘consequences’ for its columns (or rows, 
respectively).”  
Like in many other fields, prevalent among approaches for cyber security experts 
is the use of risk matrices based on ordinal scales (Hubbard & Seiersen, 2016). These scales 
normally represent likelihood and impact with categories labeled as very low, low, 
medium, high, very high, or sometimes use numbers on a scale of one to five. See 
Figure 1 for an example of a risk level assessment scale providing a qualitative approach 
to risk assessment based on the combination of likelihood and impact. 
Figure 1. Assessment Scale – Level of Risk (Combination of Likelihood and 
Impact). Source: NIST SP 800-30 (2012, p. I-1). 
Usually, the matrix’s impact axis contains numerical values associated with it in a 
semi-quantitative fashion. The impact axis is normally based on a qualitative scale, where 
the levels of impact are judgment-based. However, these scales may have implicit 
quantitative values that might not be recognized. The likelihood and impact scores are 
mapped to a cell within the matrix. The cells are generally assigned numbers called risk 
scores and aim to represent a quantitative assessment of the risk with higher scores 
indicating higher risks.  
Other times, rather than assigning specific numbers or scores to cells, a risk matrix 
shows a color-coding schema assigned to denote the overall score. The color-coding often 
19 
appeals as an easy visualization tactic. For example, see how Figure 2’s bright red shows 
a very likely event associated with a very high impact, warning of danger or high risk. The 
number and color schemes in a risk matrix can be combined (see Figure 3).  
 
Figure 2. Risk (Combination of Likelihood and Impact). Source: DOD RMF 
KS, https://rmfks.osd.mil/rmf/RMFImplementation/AssessControls/Pages/
ResidualRisk.aspx (accessed 2020). 
 
Figure 3. Example of a Risk Matrix with Numbers and Color Codes. Source: 
Ibtida and Pamungkas (2018). 
Sometimes, the matrix also contains explanations relating to the labels or numbers, 
specifying the qualitative terms in semi-quantitative values. There may even be additional 
descriptions in an effort to help better define the qualitive terms. The NIST Special 
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Publication 800-30 risk level assessment scale shows a qualitative and semi-quantitative 
approach to risk assessment (see Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4. Assessment Scale – Level of Risk. Source: NIST SP 800-30 (2012, 
p. I-2). 
Unsurprisingly, risk matrices have been highly adopted as approaches to risk 
management, receiving praise for simplicity and effectiveness; a simple table to assess such 
complex factors is often welcome. According to Cox (2008), risk matrices have certain 
advantages: 
• Simple appearing inputs and outputs 
• May utilize flashy colored grids 
• Easy documentation for rationale of risk priority and ranking settings 
• Allow systematic review of individual and groups of risks 
• Facilitate stakeholder participation to categorize category definitions and 
action levels 
• Allow for organizational training on risk culture at all levels 
21 
• Assist leadership in defining categories and expressing risk appetite 
• Creation/usage requires no expertise in quantitative risk assessment or data 
analysis (Cox, 2008, p. 498). 
Despite risk matrices’ popularity, no evidence actually exists that the matrices reduce 
or improve risk management decisions. Rather, evidence does show that risk matrices lead 
to issues: lack of standardization and meaning, range compression, the presumption of 
regular intervals, and the addition of mathematical errors and inconsistencies (Ball & Watt; 
2013; Cox, 2008, Hubbard, 2009; Hubbard & Seiersen, 2016; Klipstein, 2017; Levine, 
2012; Peace, 2017). Some issues are easily corrected while remedying others proves more 
problematic (Thomas, Bratvold, & Bickel, 2013). 
Further demonstrating the concern for risk matrices’ lack of standardization is an 
experiment conducted in 2009, which demonstrated that having clearly defined values does 
not guarantee a universal interpretation. In the experiment, over 200 participants read 
sentences from the 2007 report on the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Control (IPCC) 
and were asked to assign numerical values to probability terms (Budescu, Broomell, & Por, 
2009). Definitions of the numerical values were available for terms such as Very Likely, 
Likely, Unlikely, and Very Unlikely (Budescu et al., 2009). Results of the experiment 
proved that the participants still subjectively assigned their own values to these terms even 
with access to the definitions (Budescu et al., 2009). For example, participants interpreted 
Likely to mean between 45% and 84% even though Likely was defined as greater than 66% 
(Hubbard, 2009; Budescu et al., 2009). While one seeming benefit of qualitative risk 
assessments is improved communication and understanding (Romona, 2011), this 
experiment suggests the contrary, as this method can cause confusion and errors in 
communication (Budescu et al., 2009). 
Risk matrices demonstrate two additional issues: range compression and the 
presumption of regular intervals. Range compression results when the same qualitative 
rating is assigned to vastly different quantitative risks (Cox, 2008), generally because of a 
large risk range per category (Levine, 2012). For example, consider numbers in a risk 
assessment with a 1 to 5 or 1 to 10 scale and how large of an impact even minor movement 
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would have (Klipstein, 2017). Usage of small amounts in the scale for most of the ratings 
further amplify this problem. For example, Hubbard and Seiersen (2016) examined cyber 
security risks from five separate organizations and found that roughly 76% of the scores 
were either a 3 or 4. This clustering of scores can have an even larger impact on risk-based 
decisions. Most individuals might assume that the numbers on a scale are at least relatively 
close to the magnitudes associated with those items and that they have regular intervals, if 
the scale range decreases then the magnitude of impact would increase (Klipstein, 2017). 
For example, assuming that the scale of 1-2-3-4-5 contains regular intervals would mean 
that a score of 4 is twice as good or bad as a 2 although this is not necessarily true (Hubbard, 
2009; Savage, 2002). 
This area of concern with risk matrices and the addition of mathematical errors and 
inconsistency is highlighted by the extensive research conducted by Cox, Babayev & 
Huber, 2005; Cox, 2008; Hubbard, 2009; Hubbard & Seiersen, 2016; Thomas, Bratvold & 
Bickel, 2013. Cox et al. (2005) discusses uninformative ratings and reversed rankings. 
Uninformative rantings occur when “assigning the most severe qualitative risk label to 
small quantitative risks while giving the same ranking to risks differing by many orders of 
magnitude” (Cox et al., 2005, p. 1). Reversed rankings occur when “higher qualitative risks 
are assigned to situations that have lower quantitative risks” Cox et al., 2005, p. 1). Thomas 
et al. (2013) discuss ranking reversal in their research, which examined 30 risk 
management case studies in the oil industry. They found that, in 5 out of 30 case studies, 
the risk scores were reversed. Thus, risk matrices rankings are “arbitrary; whether 
something is ranked first or last, for example, depends on whether one creates an increasing 
or a decreasing scale” (Thomas et al., 2013, p. 18). Cox (2008, p. 1) also believes that risk 
matrices may result in suboptimal resource allocation because “effective allocation of 
resources to risk‐reducing countermeasures are not based on the same categories.” The 
categorization of inputs (i.e., likelihood or impact), and resulting outputs (i.e., risk ratings), 
requires subjective judgments and interpretations, further complicated by uncertainty (Cox, 
2008; Hubbard, 2009; Hubbard & Seiersen, 2016). 
D. SUBJECTIVE INPUTS AND ESTIMATES
Many risk-based decisions made by Subject Matter Experts (SME) require subjective 
inputs and estimates. These subjective judgments, coupled with uncertainty, induce 
inconsistencies often amplified by the different people involved in the decision-making 
process and do not account for additional individual heuristics or biases. The following 
sections examine potential impacts of subjectivity, calibration, and overconfidence, 
overestimation, and inconsistency. 
1. Subjectivity
Uncertainty within risk management clouds consideration and induces risk in the 
mind of decisionmakers; therefore, in many organizations, including the DON, leaders do 
not make decisions without SME counsel or advice (Klipstein, 2017). These inputs are 
generally in the form of subjective verbal statements, risk matrices, color coding, and other 
communications that may introduce errors via bias, heuristics, group think, inconsistency, 
overconfidence, or overestimation of risk into the assessment (Bazerman & Moore, 2013; 
Fischhoff, 1982; Hubbard, 2009; Hubbard & Seiersen, 2016; Kahneman, 2011; Klipstein, 
2017).  
2. Calibration Applied to SMEs
Professional technicians, engineers, and scientists are trained to only use tools and 
instruments that are properly calibrated. SMEs must apply a similar rigor when being 
utilized as tools within risk assessments (Hubbard & Seiersen, 2016). In many risk 
decisions, SMEs assess probabilities directly or indirectly. They can estimate probability 
quantitatively, “there is a 10% chance this system will fail”; qualitatively, “it is unlikely 
this system will fail”; or semi-quantitatively, “on a scale of 1 to 5, the likelihood of this 
system failing is a 1.” Considering that human experts serve as tools during risk 
management processes, it would seem reasonable to want to know their performance record 
in assessing the probability, impact, or even identification of potential risks (Hubbard, 
2009; Hubbard & Seiersen, 2016). Human judgment is present in nearly every type of risk 
management, even the most advanced quantitative analysis of risks (Hubbard & Seiersen, 
2016). Research has shown that nearly all people, including SMEs and managers, do very 
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poorly at assessing the probabilities of future events (Hubbard, 2009; Hubbard & Seiersen, 
2016; Kahneman & Tversky, 1972; Keren, 1987). 
Even with these issues, research suggests that SMEs and managers should support 
the risk management process and insist that the system properly accounts and adjusts for 
the likely shortfalls (Hubbard & Seiersen, 2016); one way to do so is through calibration 
training. Although SMEs and managers might be experts in their fields, they are almost 
never experts in estimating probabilities such as impact and likelihood; in other words, 
unless one is a probabilities expert, one is definitely unlikely to be able to apply 
probabilities correctly. Training, which Hubbard (2009) refers to as calibration, can help 
correct this issue. Calibration can be described as the correlation between a person’s 
judgment of execution and their actual execution (Keren, 1991). Research suggests that, 
when compared, calibrated individuals making probability assessments significantly 
outperform non-calibrated individuals (Hubbard & Seiersen, 2016; Lichtenstein, 
Fischhoff, Phillips, 1981). “Assessing uncertainty is a general skill that can be taught with 
a measurable improvement” (Hubbard, 2014, p. 95). Chapter IV examines if this 
calibration exists in the DON RMF process, and, if not, where its implementation might 
assist in improved risk management and increased cyber resiliency. 
3. Overconfidence, Overestimation, and Inconsistency 
Research also suggests that overconfidence might have the largest impact on the 
vulnerability of human judgment to biases, particularly because of its commonality and its 
potential to inadvertently add errors and additional biases (Angner, 2006; Bazerman & 
Moore, 2013; Fischhoff, 1982; Herrmann, 2013; Kahneman, 2011). According to Prims 
and Moore (2017), the three types of overconfidence, overestimation, overplacement, and 
overprecision, are defined as follows:  
• Overestimation, the belief that you are better than you truly are at something 
• Overplacement, an exaggerated belief that you are better than others at 
something 
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• Overprecision, the excessive belief that you know the truth about something 
(Prims & Moore, 2017, p. 29)  
Like most organizations, the DON RMF process is not immune to overconfidence 
(Gardner, 2010; Silver, 2012). Also, incentives and the level of effort put into identifying 
potential surprises can increase overconfidence (Lichtenstein & Fischoff, 1977). An 
additional challenge of measuring overconfidence and overestimation is that time is often 
a limiting factor. It could take years of collecting estimates from experts to compare them 
to real world outcomes. 
A person who overestimates risk is one who assigns a higher risk value than is 
necessary (Klipstein, 2017). For example, most people tend to overestimate the probability 
of rare events happening (Wouter Botzen, Kunreuther, & Michel-Kerjan, 2015) as evident 
in the key findings of a 2013 research study conducted to determine how well IT experts 
assess risk (Herrmann, 2013). Unlike other fields such as medicine or natural disasters, 
where nonexperience often contributes to underestimations and previous experience leads 
to more realistic probability estimates, previous experiences with IT risks lead to an 
overestimation of probability (Herrmann, 2013). Decisionmakers often overweigh low 
probabilities of success while under-weighing higher risks (Klipstein, 2017), which can 
also be referred to as low-probability/high-consequence (LP-HC) events, or tail events 
(Wouter Botzen et al., 2015). For an everyday example, consider that some people buy 
lottery tickets but not insurance even though they live in a likely disaster area (Heilbronner 
et al., 2010; Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Klipstein, 2017; Woutzer Botzen et al., 2015). 
Ramler and Felderer (2013, p. 95) conducted a study involving SME risk estimates 
of a web-based application. Six experts, heavily involved in the development phase, were 
asked to provide estimates on the probability of a component or application part being 
defective. Researchers recorded the risk estimations—given under the subjective ratings 
terms of high, medium, or low—at the end of the development phase then compared to the 
data results following the testing phase. SMEs agreed on risk estimates 16.7% of the time 
when the components were mostly estimated as low probability (see Figure 5). Conversely, 
SMEs significantly disagreed on risk estimates 16.7% of the time, which, in this context, 
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means that one expert classified a component as a high-risk probability while another 
classified the same component as low.  
Figure 5. Expert Estimates of Risk Probability for Application Parts and 
Components. Source: Ramler and Felderer (2013, p. 95). 
Overall, the expert estimations had a 52.8% accuracy rate. Of the study’s 36 
components, SMEs underestimated seven of fifteen high-risk probabilities (see Figure 6). 
Many components estimated as medium risks were, contrastingly, overestimated, and the 
remaining components estimated as low risks were slightly overestimated. 
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Figure 6. Estimated Risk Probability vs. Actual Risk Exposure. Source: 
Ramler and Felderer (2013, p. 96). 
A different way to measure subjectivity, which is not limited by time in the same 
manner, is the measure of consistency amongst SMEs. According to Goldberg (1968), 
consistency can be measured by stability or consensus. Stability refers to when an expert 
agrees with their own previous judgments in an identical situation. Consensus refers to 
when one expert is in agreement with other experts. Researchers have observed experts as 
inconsistent in both stability and consensus (Hubbard & Seiersen, 2016; Monti & Carenini, 
2000). Ross, Kreinovich, & Wu (2000, p. 450), during research supported by NASA to 
create an automated knowledge-based system from SME elicitations to aid in making 
similar decisions when SMEs might not be available, recognized similar issues stemming 
from the expert’s internal reasoning and its formalized representation. When SMEs are 
faced with an inconsistency, they often make changes to their original estimates that can 
result in completely different adjustments that could be considered random (Ross et al., 
2000). 
Research shows that overconfidence increases when more information becomes 
available, when questions become more difficult, or when regular systematic feedback is 
lacking or influenced by the cognitive style of the expert (Dawes, 1994; Lichtenstein & 
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Fischhoff, 1977; Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, & Phillips, 1981; Tetlock, 2005). Also, 
overconfidence could be reduced provided that experts receive prompt, frequent, and 
unambiguous feedback (Lichtenstein et al., 1980). Apparently, requesting experts to 
consider reasons that they may be wrong (Koriat, Lichtenstein, & Fischhoff, 1980) or 
incentivizing for accuracy (Hoelzl & Rustichini, 2005) both can reduce the overconfidence 
tendency. Contrastingly, informing experts about overconfidence and directing them to be 
cautious appears to only make a slight difference (Fischhoff, 1982).  
A few key findings from Mcbride, Fidler, & Burgman (2012) stated that, while 
experts possess valuable knowledge, they may require training to communicate their 
knowledge more accurately. A 2015 case study involving 2,860 intelligence analyst 
forecasters, 494,552 forecasts, and 344 individual forecasting questions—over a period of 
three years—showed that calibration training increased the confidence and accuracy of 
probability assessments for real world geo-political events (Moore et al., 2017). In short, 
the performance of a well-calibrated analyst can be assessed by the accuracy of their 
assessments over time (Moore et al., 2017), and prediction is a learned skill and something 
that can be improved with practice (Frick, 2015, para. 11). 
4. Heuristics
Heuristics guide human judgment and decision-making (Bhatia, 2015, p. 232); 
mental shortcuts that human beings use to process complex events, unusual situations, and 
everyday information they encounter (Colwell, 2005). Humans use heuristics to make 
“educated guesses” when information is lacking (Davis, Kulick, & Egner, 2005; Dowd, 
Petrocelli, & Wood, 2014; Kahneman, 2003). Basing decisions, often unknowingly, on 
mental shortcuts can lead to serious errors in logic and reasoning in certain decision-
making scenarios (Colwell, 2005). According to Tversky and Kahneman (1974), the three 
categories of heuristics are: representativeness, availability, and anchoring and adjustment. 
Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, & Johnson (2000) added a fourth category: affect. The effects 
of heuristics can be further compounded by assuming that the human mind is analogous to 
a machine regarding how risk information may be handled (Joffe, 2003). 
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The representativeness heuristic can explain numerous findings in the judgment 
and decision-making literature, often notably in the context of risk and uncertainty 
(Krawczyk & Rachubik, 2019). According to Davis et al. (2005), representativeness 
happens when someone believes that an object belongs to a class based on how much it 
resembles that class. A piece of information is considered to have high representativeness 
if it is judged to have many similar characteristics of a category’s salient features (Olson, 
1976). This can also apply when comparing new information to other pieces of information. 
Representativeness can impact how people judge a cause and effect based off the similarity 
of other observed events (Davis et al., 2005). Tversky and Kahneman (1974) showed that, 
when estimating probabilities, where representativeness is present, prior probabilities will 
be neglected for consideration. Managers are often required to make decisions in conditions 
where information is limited, and they will apply heuristics to fill in information or data 
gaps (Brookins & Ryvkin, 2014; Wickham, 2003). As demonstrated in the Budescu et al. 
(2009) case study, representativeness could result in people overriding information that is 
present and replacing it with their own values, leading to incorrect assumptions that 
relationships exist between pieces of information when they do not. The representativeness 
heuristic exemplifies “how practical rules for decision-making may lead to suboptimal 
decision outcomes” (Wickham, 2003, p. 163). 
The availability heuristic suggests that the ease with which an event can be brought 
to mind or imagined is used as a substitute for probability, meaning that, the easier it is to 
retrieve a similar event from memory, the more likely we are to assume it has a higher 
probability (Davis et al., 2005; Juslin, 2013; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Tversky and 
Kahneman (1974) gave the example of overestimating the risk of dying from a heart attack 
in middle age by recalling the occurrences amongst acquaintances: a person not 
remembering such occurrences may consider the overall probability low-risk and vice 
versa. Similarly, people are more likely to recall relatively recent events than older events. 
Like all heuristics, the probability heuristic is not inherently negative; it can be a 
useful guide of probability in some real-life circumstances; however, because the ease of 
retrieval or imagination is affected by factors other than probability or frequency, this 
heuristic may produce a number of biases or cognitive illusions in probability judgment 
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(Juslin, 2013; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). These biases can arise as either a consequence 
of biases in the external flow of information or because of the properties of encoding and 
retrieval relevant to human memory (Juslin, 2013). Highly emotional or interesting events 
tend to receive higher priority and are better encoded in memory (Juslin, 2013). 
Additionally, imaginability plays an important part in evaluating real world situations, as 
a disaster may be easier to visualize yet its likelihood may be overestimated, or conversely, 
a hard-to-imagine event may cause a risk to be underestimated (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974). While the availability heuristic is intended to simplify the situation, it can also limit 
the consideration of outcomes, a situation that can be further complicated or even 
detrimental when the decisionmaker has incomplete data (Klipstein, 2017). 
The anchoring and adjustment heuristic refers to when a person makes an estimate 
by starting from an initial value that is then adjusted up or down to arrive at a final answer 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), normally most evident in negotiations. In the phenomenon 
known as anchoring (Davis et al., 2005; Epley, 2013; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), the 
initial value serves as a starting point and “may be suggested by a formulation of the 
problem or a result of a partial computation” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, p. 1128). 
Regardless of how the mind establishes the anchor, the adjustments—shiftings from the 
initial value to reach the final value (Davis et al., 2005)—are generally insufficient as 
“different starting points will produce different estimates that are biased towards the initial 
values” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, p. 1128). In most situations, the anchor results in a 
biased final value as people tend to stay close to the anchored value whether it was relevant 
to the judgment or not (Epley, 2013). The anchoring and adjustment heuristics’ effects are 
compounded when decisions are made quickly (Yudkowsky, 2008) and even more so when 
estimates are presented as confidence intervals (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Numerous 
studies have asserted that when participants state that they are 98% confident that a number 
is within a certain range, they are only correct about 60% of the time (Lichtenstein, 
Fischoff, & Phillips, 1977; Tversky & Kahneman 1974). Negotiation and dispute 
resolution scholars have identified the profound impact of the anchoring and adjustment 
heuristic, including Orr & Guthrie’s 2006 extensive meta-analysis that showed potential 
dangers that anchoring had on final outcomes.  
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In 2000, Finucane et al. proposed that affective feelings may affect judgment and 
decision-making. Distress, disgust, sadness, anger, fear, surprise, or happiness can all affect 
decisions (Clore & Huntsinger, 2007; Klipstein, 2017), a phenomenon known as the affect 
heuristic. Specifically, depictions of events and objects end up tagged with various affects 
in people’s minds to various degrees (Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2007) 
creating an affect pool that holds the positive and negative tags associated with conscious 
and unconscious representations during the process of making judgments. People then 
make recollections from their affect pool (Slovic et al., 2007). Finucane et al. (2000, p. 3) 
states that affect plays an important role in judgments similar to how “imaginability, 
memorability, and similarity serve as cues for probability judgments in the availability and 
representativeness heuristics.” According to Zajonc (1980), affective reactions are usually 
an automatic, initial reaction that guides information processing and judgment. 
Zajonc (1980) believes that all perceptions contain some affect, giving the example of 
people, when choosing a car or house, justifying the choice to buy the one they find 
attractive due to various other reasons. Finucane et al. (2000, p. 3) believes that using an 
affective impression can be “much easier and more efficient than weighing pros and cons 
or recalling examples from memory, particularly when making complex decisions where 
mental resources are limited.” 
5. Bias
Biases are tendencies to view information from a perspective that prevents the 
person from being objective and impartial and can lead to poor judgments and decisions 
(Pfleeger & Caputo, 2012). Cognitive bias is referred to as a systematic pattern of deviation 
from a standard of rationality in judgment (Hastelton, Nettle & Andrews, 2005) and can 
serve as an error in judgment and decision-making caused by misconceptions (Phillips-
Wren, Power, & Mora, 2019). Cognitive biases are present when making judgments and 
decisions and apply to both everyday individuals as well as experts (Keil, Depledge & Rai, 
2007). Previous research has shown that humans tend to make suboptimal decisions from 
a rational viewpoint (Phillips-Wren et al., 2019). These suboptimal decisions stem from 
the close connection that cognitive biases have with decision-making because people 
understand and foster predictable thinking patterns (Dvorsky, 2013; Tversky & Kahneman, 
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1974). Biases can stem from previous experiences, emotional responses to stimuli, views, 
beliefs, individual limitations of mental processing power, or perceptions of the 
environment (Davis et al. 2005; Tversky & Kahneman 1974). Biases are utilized in 
everyday choices. For instance, we may be biased when deciding what school to send our 
children to, what kind of suit or dress to buy, who we want to win the Super Bowl, or what 
color to paint our houses (Klipstein, 2017). Most significantly, bias is present in the 
heuristics used to foster understanding and perceptions for experts, analysts, and 
decisionmakers (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Many biases can lead to poor estimations 
of probabilities, frequencies, values, and estimates including, IT-related risk assessments 
(Hermann, 2013). While literature has not defined a finite list of every bias that every 
expert, analyst, or decisionmaker may face, the following section discusses some common 
biases: confirmation bias, attention bias, belief bias, and the clustering illusion (Davis et 
al., 2005; Gilovich, Vallone, & Tversky, 1985; Klipstein, 2017). 
Confirmation bias “is the tendency to acquire, interpret, favor, or recall information 
in a way that is consistent” with or strengthens “a person’s preexisting beliefs” or desired 
end state (Allahverdyan & Galstyan, 2014, p.1). Confirmation bias can impact how people 
determine which information they avoid or approach, process and interpret, and recall from 
memory (Mothes, 2017), and confirmation biases pervade many fields such as psychology, 
economics, media, politics, and scientific practices (Allahverdyan & Galstyan, 2014). For 
example, as Mothes (2017) describes, a person who supports raising the minimum wage 
will most likely read an article that emphasizes the positive aspects of raising the minimum 
wage, reaffirming the person’s existing beliefs. Confirmation bias works the other way, 
also: that same person would be less inclined to read about the troubles raising the 
minimum wage could cause (Mothes, 2017). In both ways, confirmation bias can cause 
detrimental consequences as a person may downplay or ignore relevant information may 
leading to flawed analysis and suboptimal decision-making. 
Attention bias is the tendency for a person to focus their attention towards certain 
stimuli while ignoring or disregarding other information as irrelevant (Cherry, 2020, para. 
2). Attention bias not only impacts the information perceived in the environment, but also 
the decisions made based upon those perceptions (Cherry, 2020, para. 1). For example, 
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previous research has shown that smokers will fixate on information or cues pertaining to 
cigarette smoking (Begh et al., 2013). Attention bias may lead decisionmakers to ignore or 
downgrade relevant information, resulting in inaccurate or poor choices. 
Belief bias is the propensity to assess the strength of argument based on the 
believability of its outcome, rather than the logical support offered (Sternberg & Leighton, 
2004). A person is more likely to accept an argument when the conclusion coincides with 
their values, beliefs and prior knowledge while dismissing alternative arguments (Evans, 
Newstead & Byrne, 1993, p. 118). Markovits and Nantel (1989) indicated a significant 
belief bias in subjects during the production and evaluation of conclusions where belief 
was predominantly used to resolve uncertainties. According to Davis et al. (2005), there is 
a broad consensus to the presence of belief bias, that once people make an interpretative 
story, all subsequent observations will be processed within an interpretive filter where they 
notice supportive data and discard other data. Therefore, belief bias can lead 
decisionmakers to fail to process pertinent information because they have already made up 
their mind, which may result in less than favorable and potentially detrimental choices. 
The clustering illusion bias is a natural human tendency to see patterns when no 
patterns actually exist (Gilovich, 1991; Gilovich, Vallone, & Tversky, 1985). Sometimes 
referred to as the gambler’s fallacy (Gilovich, Vallone, & Tversky, 1985; Oskarsson, Van 
Boven, Mcclelland & Hastie, 2009; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), clustering illusion bias 
can be observed when people interpret patterns or trends in available data (Albert, Bedek, 
Huszar & Nussbaumer, 2017). Gilovich, Vallone, & Tversky (1985) researched basketball 
games with several NBA and college teams where people believed players to have “hot 
hands” or to be “streak shooters.” The belief in detecting streaks in random sequences is 
caused by the general misinterpretation of chance according to which brief random 
sequences are believed to be highly representative of their developing process (Gilovich, 
Vallone, & Tversky, 1985). They concluded that the biased belief in a “hot hand” was not 
only erroneous, but could also be very costly (Gilovich, Vallone, & Tversky, 1985). 
Consider the example of flipping a fair coin 10,000 times (Klipstein, 2017). Streaks of 
heads or tails will occur; at some points, those sequences might appear as a pattern. The 
fairness of the coin may be questioned despite Bernoulli’s Law of Large Numbers 
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accounting for the streaks (Oskarsson et al. 2009). The clustering illusion has been 
observed in judgments made by everyday individuals and experts in numerous fields 
(Fischhoff, Slavic, & Lichtenstein, 1982; Kahneman, Slavic, & Tversky, 1982; Nisbett & 
Ross, 1980; Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). This bias could appear in any situation where 
an analyst or decisionmaker may view patterns as obvious on the surface, but no data exists 
that support their perception (Klipstein, 2017). 
6. Group Dynamics
In the DOD, organizational staff members routinely conduct analysis for the 
decisionmaker, an approach also prevalent within the DON. Simultaneously, assertive and 
sometimes aggressive personalities commonly fill key positions to maximize the likelihood 
of mission success (Klipstein, 2017). Within groups, decisions are rarely a product of an 
individual (Adams, 2015, para. 1). According to Greer, Caruso and Jehn (2011), in a study 
analyzing 66 teams in the financial and telecommunications industries, teams with high 
power personalities had greater levels of internal process conflict and reduced team 
effectiveness. Subordinates or peers may disagree with one another, or with decisions, to 
the point that they begin questioning the knowledge, abilities, and understanding of the 
task at hand (Klipstein, 2017). This cognitive doubt within the disagreeing individuals may 
then turn into an unspoken agreement once a group decision is made (Asch, 1955, 1956; 
Gilovich, 1991). Pressures such as time constraints, budgets, or majority consensus can 
also result in groupthink (Katopol, 2015), which normally results in suboptimal decisions 
as in the Bay of Pigs (Janis, 1972). According to Bang and Frith (2017), groupthink can 
result from lack of independence within the group (i.e., the group members are too similar 
in knowledge, education, and experience, or when members are initially dissimilar, they 
adapt to one another through social interaction). Groupthink and subjectivity arising from 
group dynamics may result in the presentation of a flawed analysis to the decisionmaker. 
E. CHAPTER CONCLUSION
Risk itself means the potential for loss, and, naturally, different people estimate
potential risks of various endeavors differently, leading to an increased need for a shared 
language and a deep understanding of the underpinnings of risk assessment including 
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examining whether an idea that something is immeasurable actually is true or resulting 
from a faulty premise. Of several approaches to risk assessment, individuals often, 
particularly in the cyber security field, choose a qualitative approach, generally preferred 
because of its perceived ease of communication and understanding. However, research has 
overwhelmingly shown numerous issues with qualitative risk approaches, including 
subjective inputs, which can give rise to overconfidence, heuristics, and bias including 
groupthink. Issues with qualitative risk approaches are further compounded by the common 
use of risk matrices, which inject issues such as range compression, a presumption of 
regular intervals, and mathematical errors and inconsistencies into the risk process. Across 
the RMF process, such issues make a qualitative approach untenable. While quantitative 
models are not necessarily immune to similar issues, they do offer a path to address the 
concerns of subjective inputs and mitigate the challenges that risk matrices pose. For 
example, individuals may undergo calibration training to improve their subjective 
estimates and increase consistency. Chapter III examines the current DON RMF process 
in light of these findings. 
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III. RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK (RMF)
For almost fifty years, the Department of Defense (DOD) has worked on system 
accreditation and authorization to ensure systems cybersecurity. The DOD accreditation 
and authorization process is based on “testing and certification for information systems and 
an assessment of the security risks posed when connecting those systems to the DOD’s 
Global Information Grid (GIG)” (Valladares, 2013, p. 7). In 1972, DOD released the first 
iteration: DOD Directive 5200.28, Security Requirements for Automated Information 
Systems; in 1983, DOD released the second: Directive 5200.28-STD, which was then 
updated in 1988. Through these three directives, DOD formed the foundation for its 
information system testing and accreditation. Like most foundations, the directives were a 
solid start yet contained gray areas open to interpretation, particularly regarding processes, 
which, in turn, led to each military service promulgating its own similar, but separate, 
guidance for its own accreditation process with similar issues.  
Initially, DOD system accreditation processes focused on discrete, individual 
systems when conducting system tests. In 1997, DOD announced the DOD Information 
Technology Security Certification and Accreditation Process (DITSCAP), with an 
objective “to establish a DOD standard infrastructure-centric approach that protected and 
secured the entities comprising the Defense Information Infrastructure 
(DII)” (Department of Defense, [DOD] 1997, p. 4). The DITSCAP presented rules and 
regulations that standardized the Certification and Accreditation (C&A) and contributed 
“to more secure system operations and a more secure DII” (DOD, 1997, p. 4). The 
process considered “the system mission, environment, and architecture while assessing 
the impact of the operation of that system on the DII” (DOD, 1997, p. 4). DITSCAP 
intended to standardize the Certification and Accreditation (C&A) process across the 
DOD enterprise architecture and end systems while minimizing risks to an acceptable 
level. Although DITSCAP ensured the DOD was trending in the right direction, 
shortcomings remained. Despite systems being recognized as a piece of the larger 
enterprise architecture, they were still tested and accredited individually (Valladares, 
2013). Additionally, DITSCAP was paperwork-intensive and lacked a standardized list 
of controls. 
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In 2006, to fix the remaining issues, especially the need for viewing the larger 
architecture as a whole (Williams and Steward, 2007). DOD supplanted DITSCAP with 
provisional guidance: the DOD Information Assurance Certification and Accreditation 
Process (DIACAP), which was finalized in 2007 (Valladares, 2013). Its purpose was to 
“address the paradigm shift in IA security from an individual information system-level 
approach, to a DOD-wide enterprise approach of securing information systems in a net-
centric environment and for supporting the implementation of IA security during a 
system’s life cycle” (Williams and Steward, 2007). DIACAP consisted of three essential 
elements to support the conversion of DOD Information Systems to Global Information 
Grid (GIG) standards and a net-centric environment that enabled assured information 
sharing in accordance with federal standards and guidelines (Williams and Steward, 2007). 
The DIACAP policy accomplished several goals. It defined standards for security 
and outlined process requirements for the identification, implementation, and validation 
of IA controls (Williams & Steward, 2007). The DIACAP Knowledge Service 
(KS) provided a central location for execution and implementation guidance. The 
Enterprise Mission Assurance Support Service (eMASS) introduced an automated web 
support tool designed to assist the DIACAP process by reducing paperwork, limiting 
resource usage, lowering time consumption, incorporating an enterprise perspective, 
and improving operational sustainment (Department of Defense [DOD], 2007). 
Overall, DIACAP provided a noticeable improvement to DITSCAP; however, while the 
DOD fully adopted DIACAP, the remainder of Federal Government and the 
Intelligence Community used different C&A processes and security controls, and 
those differences posed significant challenges to interconnectivity and interoperability. 
In 2014, to address that issue, DIACAP morphed into the RMF, derived from the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) RMF. The term “morphed” rather 
than “replaced” is used to demonstrate the promise that the RMF evolved from the same 
C&A process and controls of DIACAP and would remain applicable throughout the whole 
Federal Government while allowing reciprocity for interagency applications. Even though 
a close correlation exists between the intent and processes outlined in the DIACAP and 
RMF, the RMF meant major changes. The RMF included a stronger integration effort with 
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the Systems Development Life Cycle (SDLC); a focus on reciprocity between Federal 
Government systems; continuous Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) 
reporting; and continuous monitoring (Williams & Steward, 2007). Additionally, the NIST 
SP-800-53 standardized control set replaced the DODI 8500.2, and C&A changed to 
Assessment and Accreditation (A&A) (Valladares, 2013).  
As helpful as DOD’s advances in the last fifty years have been for ensuring 
information security, DOD and DON may need an instruction that enables better cyber 
resiliency and allows more rapid evolution to match the rapidly changing IT landscape. 
Building on Chapter II’s review of risk and risk assessment methods, Chapter III 
specifically examines the DON’s RMF process through the six current steps. 
A. CURRENT DON RMF PROCESS
The DON RMF is a six-step process to provide authorization of IT systems and
services (US Fleet Cyber Command (FCC)/Space and Naval Warfare (SPAWAR) 
Command, 2015). This risk-based cybersecurity approach primarily focuses on managing 
risks for Navy IT by implementing tailored security controls and incorporating security 
into all facets of a systems life cycle rather than trying to add it on after the fact (US FCC/
SPAWAR, 2015). The following sections further describe each step (see Figure 7). 
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Figure 7. Navy RMF Process Overview. Source: Barrett (2017). 
1. RMF Step One: Categorize System 
The first RMF step (see Figure 8), is solely administrative and requires the 
concurrence of all stakeholders to produce a consolidated effort in system categorization. 
Then, to accurately categorize the system, all stakeholders must define the system 
boundaries and identify and document all types of information processed, stored, or 
transmitted by the Information System (IS).  
Figure 8. RMF Step One – System Categorization. Source: Barrett (2017). 
The primary goal in RMF Step One is to identify potential security impacts if a 
security breach results from a loss across each of three system security objectives: 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability. The potential security impacts are classified as 
either low, moderate, or high (see Figure 9). 
Figure 9. RMF System Categorization Impact Values. Source: Miller, 
Kiriakou, and Hilton (2015). 
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At the completion of Step One, a completed Navy System Categorization form, an initial 
System Security Plan (SP), the beginning of an enterprise Mission Assurance Support 
Service (eMASS) record, and, if applicable, a DOD Information Technology Portfolio 
Repository DON (DITPR-DON) record are produced. Based on Step One’s system 
categorization, RMF Step Two identifies the system’s security controls. 
2. RMF Step Two: Select Security Controls
Once the Information Systems Security Engineer (ISSE) identifies the system’s 
security controls, common controls, and any potentially inheritable controls in Step Two, 
they would then use applicable overlays to further tailor the system (see Figure 10).  
Figure 10. RMF Step Two – Select Security Controls. Source: Barrett (2017). 
Then, the Information System Security Manager (ISSM) would update the Security 
Plan (SP) to identify any non-applicable control tailoring. The Program Manager (PM), 
working with the ISSM, would develop an initial System Life cycle Continuous Monitoring 
(SLCM) strategy. The Navy Qualified Validator (NQV), with the support of the ISSE and 
ISSM, would develop the Security Assessment Plan (SAP) to assess the resulting 
applicable security controls. 
The completion of RMF Step Two requires scheduling a mandatory checkpoint 
unless waived at the joint discretion of the Authorizing Officer (AO) Cyber Security 
Analyst (CSA) and the Security Control Assessor (SCA) Liaison. At the Step Two 
checkpoint, the AO CSA and SCA Liaison would review the SP, Security Assessment Plan 
(SAP), and SLCM Strategy and either endorse the system for AO approval or return the 
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artifacts to the originator for remediation. Step Two produces an approved System 
Categorization form, an updated SP that includes an overview of inheritance relationships, 
the initial SLCM Strategy, an initial Ports, Protocols, and Services Management (PPSM) 
Registration form, and the Security Authorization Package. 
3. RMF Step Three: Implement Security Controls
In RMF Step Three (see Figure 11), the ISSE, identifies, updates as needed, and 
implements the security controls and overlays. The ISSE uses the SAP to identify, verify, 
and validate (IV&V) the security control implementations. Pending the results of the 
preliminary control testing, if the system’s security posture is deemed insufficient, the ISSE 
then remediates vulnerabilities and retests. When testing verifies that the system’s security 
posture is sufficient, the ISSE documents the security control implementation plan and 
generates a Risk Assessment Report (RAR) to identify any findings that will not be 
corrected prior to the formal assessment in Step Four. 
Figure 11. RMF Step Three – Implement Security Controls. Source: Barrett 
(2017). 
RMF Step Three produces an updated SP based on the final implementation of 
tailored security control sets and the results of the security control implementation test 
performed to verify that the required security controls are in place. The ISSE initiates an 
RAR and creates, as required, a Plan of Actions and Milestones (POA&M) to correct 
weaknesses or deficiencies. 
4. RMF Step Four: Assess Security Controls
In RMF Step Four (see Figure 12), a Navy Qualified Validator (NQV) performs the 
official security assessment on behalf of the Security Control Assessor (SCA). The NQV 
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verifies that each security control has been implemented properly and determines each to 
be either Compliant (C) or Non-Compliant (NC). Then, based on the assessment results, 
the NQV would develop the Security Assessment Report (SAR).  
 
Figure 12. RMF Step Four – Assess Security Controls. Source: Barrett 
(2017). 
RMF Step Four’s output is derived from the findings of the security control 
assessment as well as any completed remediation actions. The SP is updated to reflect the 
true state of the security controls following the initial assessment. The NQV adds any false 
positives, misleading results, and testing exceptions discovered in the assessment results to 
the SAP for completion and SAR preparation. The ISSE remediates or mitigates any NC 
controls or vulnerabilities on the SAR and updates the RAR and POA&M. 
Finally, the NQV updates the SAR based on the updated RAR and POA&M in 
eMASS. Then the ISSM submits the Security Authorization Package and any applicable 
artifacts to the Package Submitting Officer (PSO) for review and also uploads the same 
into eMASS for adjudication by the SCA and Authorizing Official (AO). 
5. RMF Step Five: Authorize System 
In RMF Step Five (see Figure 13), once the package is processed, the PSO 
schedules the mandatory RMF Step Five Checkpoint, and the AO CSA submits the 
package to the AO for an authorization decision.  
45 
Figure 13. RMF Step Five – Authorize System. Source: Barrett (2017). 
The PSO reviews, updates if necessary, and submits the package for review. The 
Step Five checkpoint must be scheduled; however, it can be waived at the joint discretion 
of the AO CSA and the SCA Liaison. The NQV finalizes the SAR for review and signature 
by the SCA with an overall recommendation of system cybersecurity risk. Then the SCA 
signs and completes the SAR with a statement of overall system cybersecurity risk. The 
SAR, along with the rest of the package are reviewed by the AO. If the AO determines the 
overall risk level exceeds the acceptable threshold, then the package will either be returned 
for remediation or enter the Navy escalation process. If the package represents a compliant 
system and the overall risk level is determined as acceptable, the AO will issue an 
authorization decision document. If controls exist with a risk level of “Very High” or 
“High” that cannot be immediately mitigated or corrected but mission criticality justifies 
the overall system risk, then, only with the permission of the DON Chief Information 
Officer (CIO), will an AO issue an Authority to Operate (ATO) with conditions. 
6. RMF Step Six: Continuous Monitoring
In RMF Step Six (see Figure 14), the ISSM implements a continuous monitoring 
strategy as agreed upon in the final authorization decision. 
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Figure 14. RMF Step Six – Continuous Monitoring. Source: Barrett (2017). 
The ISSM tracks the SAP and its associated security controls in eMASS for 
compliance for the life cycle of the system. Re-authorization occurs as required for system 
updates or periodicity. This phase is comprised of two subprocesses: first,  an annual 
security review, monthly scanning and patching, and triennial reauthorization; and, second, 
a conditionally-based subprocess comprised of incident response, Communications 
Tasking Orders (CTO), Cyber Security Inspection (CSI) and Command Cyber Readiness 
Inspection (CCRI) findings and decommissioning. If, at any point, events occur that require 
corrective actions or the system’s level of risk exceeds its tolerance threshold, the PM must 
take necessary corrective actions. If the PM/ISO cannot mitigate the risk level to an 
acceptable tolerance level, they will request a new assessment for authorization, if 
applicable, and the system will reenter the RMF process. 
B. CHAPTER CONCLUSION
RMF has undergone numerous iterations over thirty-five years to reach its current
state within the DON. While it remains a lengthy and complicated process, it also remains 
crucial to ensure the security of our information systems within today’s interconnected 
world. At each of the six steps, individuals complete specific protocols, leading from 
stakeholder identification to system reviews. The next chapter applies Chapter II’s findings 
to the RMF process outlined in Chapter III to examine the potential need for a quantitative 
RMF consisting of standardized definitions, measurements, and metrics, as well as better 
training to ensure risk is being measured and mitigated appropriately. 
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IV. ANALYSIS 
This chapter applies Chapter II’s understandings regarding risk to the current DON 
RMF process outlined in Chapter III to determine any specific shortcomings and areas for 
improvement. It does so in five sections followed by a chapter conclusion: impact of 
varying definitions of risk; impact of varying measurement methods; impact of qualitative 
versus quantitative risk assessment approaches; specific impacts within the current DON 
RMF process, step by step; and the impact of five Navy-wide challenges. For assessing 
best practices, Chapter IV adopts Chapter II’s findings: risk assessment works best when: 
a) terms are well-defined, b) processes are objectively measured, and c) risk assessors are 
well-qualified. The chapter also identifies procedures where automation and other 
techniques may increase efficiency of RMF application.  
A. STANDARD RISK DEFINITION  
The absence of a clear, unambiguous definition of risk—pertaining to cybersecurity 
in general and the RMF in particular—is troubling. Defining risk is as challenging today 
as it was when the concept first emerged thousands of years ago, and, without a clear 
definition, the term is inherently subjective and, therefore, open to interpretation. In short, 
the lack of a specific risk definition is its own risk. For risk managers to effectively 
communicate, amongst themselves and with other pertinent stakeholders, they must speak 
a common language using a shared lexicon. Additionally, since risk management shares 
similar concepts and requires close coordination with various other fields such as decision 
analysis, engineering, acquisition, and statistics, the use of differing or unclear terminology 
adds unnecessary confusion and ambiguity. Improving the communication and 
understanding of risk factors requires clear terminology in order to reach optimal risk-
based decisions.  
Further, DON classifies cybersecurity risk in three categories: System 
Cybersecurity Risk; Operational Cybersecurity Risk; and Residual Cybersecurity Risk 
(Office of the Chief of Naval Operations [CNO], 2018) but has not tailored these 
definitions or defined them specifically in the DON RMF Process Guide or other governing 
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RMF documents. Lack of specifics here makes it more difficult to measure risk and leaves 
room for subjective interpretation.  
B. STANDARD MEASUREMENT METHODS 
Similar to risk, the concept of measurement also suffers from varying 
interpretations and is often misconstrued. NIST SP 800-55 Rev 1 does provide guidance 
on the measurement of Information Systems; however, despite the instruction being 
released over 12 years ago, it has not been incorporated into policy regarding measurement 
within the DON RMF. The RMF aims to reduce risk to an acceptable level, yet the DON 
RMF gives no deliberate measurements to observe whether risks are, in fact, being reduced. 
Before anything can be measured within RMF, DON must define a measurement 
methodology with specific metrics. 
The SECNAV Cybersecurity Readiness Review (2019) highlighted the lack of 
mechanisms to measure or estimate the value of items at risk and their impact within the 
DON (p. 12). NIST SP 800-55 recommends measuring implementation, effectiveness/
efficiency, and impact. Implementation is intended to focus on ensuring that security 
controls, policies, and procedures are implemented as required. Once implementation is 
considered to be 100%, the focus is shifted towards effectiveness/efficiency and impact 
measures. The DON RMF discusses measures of impact in Steps One through Six and 
measures of effectiveness and efficiency in Steps Three through Six. However, the DON 
RMF does not present explicit directions on how to conduct them. 
Measurements that do occur within the DON RMF occur in the lab and not in the 
operational environment. No defined measurements exist in any DON RMF documentation 
to determine if risk mitigations remain effective and at an acceptable level throughout the 
life cycle of the system. The failure to take deliberate measurements in the operational 
environment directly contrasts with the primary goal of RMF, which is to reduce and 
maintain risk at an acceptable level. All other system performance measures are tested in 
an operational environment to determine if they are operationally effective and suitable. In 
our research, it is not clear that the RMF process achieves that standard for operational 
cyber security and resiliency. 
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Systems do not always function in operation as they did in a lab environment. Not 
only does this prevent DON organizations from being able to justify investments to reduce 
risks, it also suggests there are no means to observe whether risks are being reduced or 
decisions are being improved under the current state of DON RMF. The words 
performance, measurement, or any reference to NIST SP-800-55 are rare, if not non-
existent, within DoDI 8510.01 as well as the DON process guide. DoDI 8500.01 mentions 
that performance will be measured and assessed for effectiveness; however, there is no 
DON guidance on how to accomplish this or any guidance that clarifies the term 
“effectiveness” within the RMF. 
If DON RMF guidance adopted standardized risk methods and risk measurements 
and placed quantified values on the components of risk, the ability to identify risks and 
determine objectively if risks are reduced would increase. Adopting such standards would 
also reduce the level of uncertainty across various risk concerns where even a small 
reduction of uncertainty within cyber security has significant impact (Hubbard & Seiersen, 
2016). As highlighted in the SECNAV CS Readiness Review, “many policy and funding 
decisions do not reflect the current risk profile” (SECNAV, 2019, p. 28). Having the 
appropriate measurements in place would allow for the proper allocation and justification 
of resources and investments as needed, leading to a more effective RMF. 
C. QUALITATIVE VERSUS QUANTITATIVE 
Additionally, because organizations use different types of approaches—qualitative, 
quantitative, and semi-quantitative—to assess risk, further confusion ensues. The guiding 
methodology for conducting risk assessments, NIST SP-800-30, recommends either a 
qualitative, quantitative, or semi-quantitative approach for each organization, further 
stating that each approach may vary based on an organization’s culture and attitude toward 
the concepts of uncertainty and risk communication. Compounding the problem, different 
approaches leave even more room for interpretation within the DON RMF since the Navy 
has not addressed this ambiguity. 
Examination of the RMF process and supporting documents identifies that the 
current posture of the DON RMF is more qualitative than quantitative. Its qualitative nature 
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is quite apparent in the risk matrices. The DON RMF appears to be shifting towards a more 
semi-quantitative approach, utilizing a combination of qualitative descriptions and 
numerical values to further define associated risk levels. However, the Navy must take care 
to prevent the inadvertent addition of errors based off subjective inputs, range compression, 
presumption of regular intervals, and mathematical errors. Other alternatives may allow 
for more accurate risk assessments and a significant reduction in uncertainty.  
Currently, many different personnel provide qualitative inputs to risk matrices. 
Within the DON RMF, risk matrices are often imbedded into other matrices as well. For 
example, risk matrices in eMASS come from additional imbedded matrices that identify 
and select likelihood and residual risk after the risk factors have been defined (Personal 
Communication, Denham, March 18, 2020). These inputs come from SMEs in their 
applicable areas of expertise.  
Currently, the NQV provides the most inputs for risk matrices; however, the SCA 
liaison and the SCA are often also involved in this process. The NQV is an independent 
third party but acts as an extension of the SCA office, validating implementation of the 
approved security control baseline (Barrett, 2017). The NQV acting as an extension is most 
observable in its determination of likelihood and risks that depend upon the selected risk 
factors. The determination of likelihood and risk differ among SYSCOMs because of the 
subjectivity and a lack of standardization within the DON. 
D. DON RMF PROCESS  
As long as the Federal Government uses the NIST RMF as the base of their RMF, 
the DON must incorporate and adapt changes more rapidly. The current DON Process 
Guide does not address all changes made to the most recent NIST SP 800-37 Rev 2, 
published in 2018. For instance, NIST 800–37 Rev 2 (2018) expanded upon the previous 
RMF process by adding a seventh step: Prepare. The following analysis of each DON RMF 
step identifies current issues and areas where changes are necessary for process 
improvement, starting with actually including Step Zero. 
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1. RMF Step Zero: Prepare 
 Introduced in the most recent revision of NIST SP 800-37 (Revision 2), NIST 
recommends a preparatory step to ensure organizations are equipped to conduct the six 
main steps of the RMF (NIST, 2018, p. 8). The purpose of Step Zero is to “complete 
essential tasks at the organization, mission and business process, and IS levels to help the 
organization prepare its management of security and privacy risks while utilizing the RMF” 
(NIST, 2018, p. 11). The prepare step can assist with quantitative measurements provided 
that standardized definitions, measurements, and metrics exist for the RMF. At the time of 
this analysis, May 2020, the DON’s RMF Process Guide does not include the prepare step. 
2. RMF Step One: Categorize System 
The categorization step impacts the remaining steps of the RMF process and has a 
large impact on budget allocation. This step is time-consuming because it requires 
concurrence between stakeholders and SMEs. That agreement leads to a system impact 
assessment, which results in the categorization of risk to the Confidentiality, Integrity, and 
Availability domains as either High, Moderate, or Low. The categorization requires the use 
of subjective estimates that may vary based on the interpretation of terms and the 
organization’s understanding of the RMF. The efficiency of this step may also vary based 
upon the organization’s approach and understanding of RMF. A standardized and more 
quantitative model, that builds on the prepare step, would better facilitate RMF Step One. 
Correct categorization of the system is crucial as it not only affects the remaining RMF 
steps, but also, if the categorization of risk is done incorrectly, it generates rework in Step 
Three. 
3. RMF Step Two: Select Security Controls  
In Step Two, an ISSE selects a baseline of security controls from the RMF 
Knowledge Service (KS) based on the overall system categorization from Step One. As the 
primary reference used when selecting security controls, the KS contains a current list of 
baseline NIST security controls as well as common DOD controls from which the ISSE 
selects and combines with proper overlays to begin the tailoring process. Since the tailoring 
can be completed differently by ISSEs, as long as the ISSE justifies their actions, the 
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selection of overlays and tailoring differences risks influence by the ISSE’s subjectivity. 
Further, the same ISSE may not always select the same overlays or tailor the system the 
same when dealing with similar or identical systems. To reduce errors within security 
control selection, the DON RMF process guide states that the ISSE can consult the NQV 
early in the process to avoid incorrect security control assignment and reduce possible later 
rework. However, this patchwork fix adds to the NQV workload and also induces validity 
and consistency questions concerning the ISSE’s choices. To avoid NQV increased 
workload and to still reduce rework costs, a tool that captures the applicability of security 
controls, overlays, and aids the ISSE in proper system tailoring may prove quite valuable.  
4. RMF Step Three: Implement Security Controls  
The implementation phase verifies that the tailored security controls and overlays 
specified in the SP are in place through a preliminary test to gauge the system’s security 
posture in order to identify and remediate any vulnerabilities prior to Step Four. The ISSE 
must conduct the preliminary test using tools specified in the SAP; however, the ISSE 
sometimes uses other tools with prior approval from the SCA. The ISSE records the SAP 
results in eMASS, identifying and measuring the implementation of security controls. This 
is currently a quantitative measure within the RMF. The current DON RMF Process Guide 
also states that any vulnerabilities discovered that cannot be corrected prior to Step Four 
must be annotated in the RAR and POA&M. However, the NAVWAR Introduction to the 
Risk Management Framework Course, a computer-based training (CBT), states that the 
RAR is no longer required or used, and this information is now recorded in eMASS. 
Organizational changes that deviate from written guidance add confusion and can result in 
more unnecessary risks. This step should be updated to reflect a standardized RMF process. 
5. RMF Step Four: Assess Security Controls  
A standardized organizational risk assessment methodology, as recommended by 
NIST, ought to support Step Four. The security controls assessment, conducted by the 
NQV, verifies that security controls are in place and compliant as specified in the SAP, as 
well as identifying residual risks for each Non-Compliant (NC) control and vulnerability. 
Step Four also uses several risk matrices throughout the risk assessment of various system 
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components as well as the overall system. Absent a standardized organizational risk 
assessment methodology, Step Four happens in a highly qualitative manner containing 
subjective inputs from the NQV to identify the severity level of each NC control. 
Crucially, the SCA currently uses the risk assessment to identify the overall system 
cybersecurity risk, risk mitigations, and residual risk within the system as a basis for their 
recommendation of approval or denial to the Authorizing Official (AO). The DON RMF 
Process Guide states that the NQV will coordinate with the SCA Liaison and act as their 
trusted advisor in all matters of risk. The SCA liaison and the SCA spot-check the NQV’s 
results as they have limited time to personally perform all the risk assessments. While the 
NQV, SCA, and SCA liaison are Cyber Security SMEs, none of them receive specialized 
training in risk, increasing the potential occurrence of many of the previously discussed 
issues with risk matrices and subjective inputs. If the risk assessment does not capture the 
most realistic risk posture, is done incorrectly, or is affected by errors, then the information 
presented to the authorizing official in Step Five will be already skewed.  
6. RMF Step Five: Authorize System 
The DON RMF process guide states that the AO will perform a final risk review 
“to determine the risk to Naval organization operations, organizational assets, individuals, 
other organizations, or the nation” (Barrett, 2017, p. 56). However, there are numerous 
authorizing officials within the DON RMF process. Different AOs are found at each Navy 
Systems Command (SYSCOM), each with its own staff and internal RMF processes. The 
AOs often have competing responsibilities and are also not SMEs in risk or risk assessment. 
The AO examines the system’s current security state based on the risk assessment and SAR 
recommendations from Step Four, in addition to any applicable risk-related guidance from 
senior DOD officials, for “a final determination of risk to DOD operations, assets, 
individuals, other organizations, and the nation from the operation and use of the system” 
(Barrett, 2017, p. 55). Examination of the DON RMF process and its supporting 
documentation leads us to believe that, rather than the AO completing a risk assessment as 
required in Step Five, the AOs usually simply concur with the SCAs’ recommendations; 
the research could find no examples to the contrary.  
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If the AO fails to actually perform a risk assessment but instead simply signs off on 
the NQV and SCA’s assessment, large problems can occur. Notably, the NQV and SCA 
are focused on the system’s performance in the lab rather than in the operational 
environment; the AO’s Step Five assessment is meant to consider how a system would 
actually do operationally. If a senior decisionmaker fails to consider operational 
performance, in terms of security and risk implications, and, instead, simply concurs with 
lab findings, Step Five becomes a compliance check, an exercise in checking the box, rather 
than an actually effective measure to determine risk prior to system authorization.  
7. RMF Step Six: Monitor Security Controls 
In addition to the very large problems stemming from Step Five “check the box” 
issues, Step Six, continuous monitoring, further endangers the Navy’s risk assessment plan 
because it also lacks clear definition and specific guidance. Similar to overall risk 
assessments, continuous monitoring is often interpreted differently from person to person 
and organization to organization. Interpretation can be especially problematic here since 
the DON relies on continuous monitoring for ongoing risk assessments once a system is 
operational. Here, a risk assessment plan that relies on subjectivity both in its construction 
and in its implementation essentially means there is no plan. 
The future goal, even though it has been an actual standing requirement since 2014, 
is to use continuous monitoring for granting system authorizations since Step Six is a 
continuous assessment of the system’s security controls over its lifetime. In addition to 
ongoing system scans and network testing conducted by entities such as the Naval Cyber 
Defense Operations Command (NCDOC), inspections such as the Cyber Security 
Inspection and Certification Program (CSICP), Command Cyber Operational Readiness 
Inspection (CCORI), and penetration testing, conducted throughout the fleet, must be 
incorporated to better facilitate continuous monitoring. The current RMF does not support 
seamless integration of these results into one source for use in continuous monitoring. 
When these inspections identify concern for the RMF process requiring further 
investigation, these concerns should feed directly to the SCA. Unfortunately, since these 
reports do not feed into this step, they do not seamlessly make their way to the SCA or 
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even interact with the DON’s eMASS tool (Personal Communication, Denham, March 18, 
2020). 
Automation would better facilitate Step Six; however, currently only approximately 
25–30% of security controls appear capable of being automated (Personal Communication, 
Denham, March 18, 2020). At a minimum, automation would allow other inspections and 
data about the system to be ingested and viewed by the SCA and would be fed directly to 
the AO. Instead, verifying that policies and procedures are updated remains a slow and 
manual process. Ongoing efforts to investigate how Artificial Intelligence (AI) and 
Machine Learning (ML) might help better facilitate this step should continue as Step Six 
needs updates, definitions, clarity, and the much-needed help of automation. 
E. NAVY-WIDE CHALLENGES LIMITING RMF 
Many root causes of risk assessment issues stem from culture, people, structure, 
process, and resource challenges present throughout the DON today. The following section 
discusses those five specific DON challenges that limit the RMF and that must be 
addressed to improve and maintain true cyber warfighting security and resiliency. 
1. Culture 
 The need for a cyber cultural change within the DON is not new; however, 
translating this idea into noticeable action remains a challenge. The SECNAV 
Cybersecurity Readiness Review characterized the DON CS culture by “distrust, a lack of 
knowledge or accountability, a willingness to accepts unknown risks to mission, a lack of 
unity of effort, and an inability to fully leverage lessons learned at scale” (SECNAV, 2019, 
p. 14). Since the implementation of the DON RMF, senior leadership has acknowledged 
that risks are growing based on increasing technological sophistication and the Navy’s 
dependency on connected capabilities and information to fight and win (SECNAV, 2019). 
The Navy has implemented many initiatives designed to address increasing risk; however, 
those initiatives have not effected meaningful change to the DON CS culture, which seems 
to lack “a real appreciation of the cyber threat” (SECNAV, 2019, p. 12). 
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For example, in 2014, after an adversary breach of the NMCI network, the DON 
responded with Task Force Cyber Awakening (TFCA). TFCA called for “cultural and 
organizational changes to meet the increasing threat” and made cybersecurity the “business 
of every Commanding Officer, calling for an ‘All Hands-on-Deck’ effort” (Office of the 
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information Dominance [OPNAV N2/N6], 2014). 
A year later, the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff (CJCS) established the DOD Cybersecurity Culture and Compliance Initiative 
(DC3I), which called for a shift in behavior and cultural norms from senior leadership down 
to the unit level and each individual’s cybersecurity performance and accountability 
(Mauck & Pashley, 2016, para. 8). Despite this, the DON RMF still lacks standard and 
measurable objectives from which leaders could drive organizations to transition to a 
system focused on institutional initiative rather than compliance, to increase CS efforts, 
and to improve risk management (SECNAV, 2019). An RMF that remains geared towards 
compliance of regulations rather than effectiveness will only provide minimum security, 
wholly inadequate for overall organizational protection. The 2019 SECNAV Cybersecurity 
reviews highlights the problem of a “check the box” mentality rather than one truly 
assessing risk: “the DON cybersecurity governance structure is characterized by an almost 
exclusive focus on compliance metrics based on a snapshot in time, which inhibit the ability 
to anticipate and/or adapt to current and future threat environments” (SECNAV, 2019, p. 
29). So far, senior leadership’s attention to necessary cultural change has not affected a 
permanent cultural change toward true risk assessment. 
2. People 
 People are obviously integral to innovation and the making of decisions within an 
organization; however, their actions and decisions expose them to great risk including 
within the DON RMF process. People, as the Navy’s greatest asset and, sometimes, the 
greatest liability, require tough training, calibration, evaluations, and proper employment. 
The world’s top organizations balance this contradictory point about the value of people 
by trusting their people while continuously testing and monitoring them to ensure the 
maintenance of established standards (SECNAV, 2019). 
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Examination of the DON RMF process and the supporting documentation suggests 
that individuals assessing risk are not risk experts but rather experts within their respective 
disciplines including cyber security, financial, and engineering. To become a certified risk 
assessor within DON RMF requires the completion of six CBT courses. However, none of 
these six courses pertains to risk, but rather they focus on RMF terms, so that the courses 
essentially train assessors on how to use an inherently subjective system without training 
them on the fundamentals of subjectivity; the use of terms without the understanding of 
those terms and other underlying factors does not help as much as it should. Additionally, 
each course examination is multiple choice with a required passing score of 80% and 
unlimited attempts to pass. This short process focused on RMF terminology contrasts with 
other fields like insurance, safety, and the financial sector where actuaries conduct risk 
assessments following many years of formalized training including a degree, professional 
certification tests, and field experience. Considering that the concept of risk management 
stems from these industries, this research effort finds the lack of similar qualifications and 
scrutiny in the Navy is particularly alarming since Navy risk assessment failure can lead 
directly to warfighting causalities. 
The DON RMF also apparently lacks any type of calibration training. While the 
SMEs consulted during this research represent a limited sample size, the authors believe 
that this finding is applicable to the entire DON. SMEs are employed as the measuring 
tools within the DON RMF process and therefore require calibration. Given the 
preponderance of SME input in the DON RMF process, we find the lack of calibration 
concerning. This concern is further compounded due to the usage of risk matrices 
imbedded into other risk matrices when making determinations of likelihood, severity, and 
risk. Case studies ranging from the 1970s to present demonstrate that calibration training 
yields a remarkable improvement in consistency and accuracy where implemented. 
The DON RMF’s first five steps require subjective estimates, which often result in 
numerous sources of error inadvertently added into the Risk Management process. The 
lack of consistency in using subjective estimates, shown by the review of the current DON 
RMF process furthers our concern. The DON RMF has no means to account for the 
potential issues caused by subjectivity, bias, heuristics, or groupthink when estimating risk. 
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Accounting for these known issues could be greatly helped by a standardized, more 
quantitative risk model. 
Analysis of the DON RMF produced inconclusive results when attempting to 
determine whether overconfidence and estimation errors are present among risk assessors 
because no metrics are used and no data is maintained regarding how assessors make 
estimates. Rather, the NQV ranking system assesses each validator on their ability to 
conduct risk assessments based on a subjective four-star ranking system from the SCA 
(Qualification Standards, Responsibilities, and Standards for Navy Qualified Validators 
(NQV), March 4, 2016). The lack of metrics to capture how assessors make estimates also 
makes it impossible to assess SME consistency. 
The Navy implementing the Identify-Recruit-Train-Sustain-Retain model 
explained in the 2019 SECNAV Cybersecurity Readiness Review would assist with fixing 
many people issues present in CS and the DON RMF. The review calls for fostering a 
career path progression that builds upon cybersecurity expertise throughout the fleet but 
appears more geared towards the strategic level.  
While this call is valid, it does not address the fundamental problem that plagues 
the Navy: the need for network operators at the operational and tactical levels to assist in 
continuous monitoring while fighting our Navy systems. The Navy enlisted ITs employed 
on ships must maintain, monitor, and fight the network; however, most ITs are not trained 
to monitor the network and the RMF or to fight the ship through a cyber-attack. The Navy 
does have an enlisted rating who are trained as cyber warriors to fight the network, 
Cryptologic Technician Networks (CTN). While addressing the issues called out in the 
SECNAV Cybersecurity Readiness Review, the authors believe that the IT rating also 
requires a training overhaul to include RMF, continuous monitoring, and fighting of naval 
networks. Otherwise the CTNs that possess these abilities must be added to ships as well 
as other operational and tactical units. Absent this immediate adaption, the good intentions 
of RMF and cyber resiliency are likely to fail. 
From a personnel perspective, the Navy’s current RMF process currently relies on 
SMEs who are ill equipped to evaluate risk because they are unarmed with any measurable 
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facts and are not educated in risk, consistency, or receive calibration training. Further, the 
Sailors who bear the brunt of the continuous monitoring role lack the training, education, 
tools, or access to successfully execute these roles. 
3. Structure 
The current organizational structure within the DON does not foster effective 
execution of RMF since there is no single authority responsible and accountable for 
managing RMF across the DON. Importantly, the SECNAV Cybersecurity Readiness 
report observed that “authority, responsibility, and decision-making power for information 
risk management has been confused by its distribution within the DON, resulting in 
fragmented, or uncertain response to the expanding threat” (SECNAV, 2019, p. 28). Under 
current DON organization, the CIO role is performed by the Under Secretary of the Navy 
(UNSECNAV), who delegates the responsibility and execution of the role to a Vice 
Admiral, the N2N6 (SECNAV, 2019). The N2N6 is not a direct subordinate of 
UNSECNAV but a subordinate of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and the Vice 
CNO. This structure violates successful industry leaders’ best practices since the actual 
person executing the CIO role does not report to senior executive leadership, in this case, 
the SECNAV, further reducing authority to completely control the DON CS and RMF 
(SECNAV 2019). 
The delegation of CIO authorities and accountabilities from the UNSECNAV to 
the uniformed military service deputies is unnecessarily convoluted. Not only does the 
delegation of authority fail to align with the May 2019 Executive Order, Enhancing the 
Effectiveness of Agency Chief Information Officers (SECNAV, 2019), it slaps handcuffs 
on the authority to enforce effectiveness. Absent a well-established “Go/No Go” criteria to 
defend against continuous threat vectors into naval networks, the current approach 
becomes merely another “check the box” to appease compliance. For example, a Fleet 
Commander can tell a ship, aircraft, DESRON, PHIBRON, or CSG that they are not 
permitted to get underway or fly if they have not met established criteria because they 
control those assets. However, under the current organization of CIO responsibilities, the 
N2N6 is not in charge of operational units and does not have the authority to directly 
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prohibit operations. The DON will not truly be serious about CS until some office/agency 
within the DON is able to prevent a unit from getting underway due to poor CS hygiene. 
4. Process 
 The Navy is a process-oriented organization, employing some very recognizable 
processes, such as the Naval Air Training Operations Procedures and Standardization 
(NATOPS), the Navy Occupational Safety and Health Program, and now the DON RMF, 
derived from the industry-leading NIST (SECNAV, 2019). Although the DOD’s RMF 
instruction intends to direct a structured cybersecurity process, the September 2018 
Cybersecurity Strategy identified specific shortfalls, also cited in the SECNAV 
Cybersecurity Readiness Review, that contribute to DON processes remaining ineffective 
in staying ahead of threats. 
To further demonstrate how the lack of a standardized risk assessment process 
results in specific shortfalls within the RMF Process Guide and supporting documentation, 
these researchers created Figure 15, demonstrating how the current documentation enters 
a circular loop that lacks specific guidance when conducting risk assessments.  
 
Figure 15. Circular Loops within DON, DOD, and NIST Governing RMF 
Documentation. 
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The starting point for any DON risk assessor should be the DON RMF process guide. The 
DON RMF process guide points to the DoDI 8510.01 and NIST SP 800-37. NIST SP 
800-37 (p .42) states that “organizations determine the form of risk assessment conducted 
(including the scope, rigor, and formality of such assessments) and method of reporting 
results.” Thus, the DON RMF process guide is supposed to be responsible for determining 
the form of risk assessment conducted. Additionally, NIST SP 800-37 simultaneously 
points to NIST SP 800-30 for further guidance on conducting risk assessments along with 
DoDI 8510.01. NIST SP 800-30 (2012, p. 5) states that “risk assessment methodologies 
are defined by organizations and are a component of the risk management strategy 
developed during the risk framing step of the risk management process.” Both NIST SP 
800-37 and NIST SP 800-30 place the organization as the responsible party to determine 
the type of risk assessment it conducts. However, a standardized or defined risk assessment 
methodology remains non-existent within the DON or DOD.  
Processes for information sharing are also affected by the absence of a standardized 
process. NIST SP 800-53 states that “realistic assessments of risk requires an understanding 
of threats to and vulnerabilities within organizations and the likelihood and potential 
adverse impacts of successful exploitations of such vulnerabilities by those threats” (NIST 
SP 800-53, p. 5). However, information sharing is inhibited across the DON, other services, 
and agencies due to the existence of vertically stove-piped organizational structures 
(SECNAV, 2019, p. 29). When a system is developed and authorized, its set of security 
controls is based off the intended system’s overall purpose and operational use. However, 
Navy systems operate throughout many different Areas of Responsibility (AORs) around 
the world, with many different threats and adversarial Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 
(TTPs), and, when authorized for use, the set of security controls assigned do not address 
every threat in every AOR. Proper information sharing would lead to better threat and 
vulnerability characterization, not only in the early development and authorization stages, 
but throughout the entire system life cycle. Additionally, information sharing would also 
help improve RMF Step Six, continuous monitoring, by utilizing threat intelligence 
efficiently and adapting security control and risk mitigations as threats evolve. 
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5. Resources 
 The SECNAV Cybersecurity Readiness Review (2019) discusses resources as a 
governance tool to achieve cybersecurity resiliency, focusing on proper resource 
allocations to achieve strategic objectives and to act as the first levers available for use by 
SECNAV to transition the Navy to becoming more information centric. The Navy needs 
increased resources for automation and risk aggregation and an overhaul or replacement of 
the current primary resource for RMF documentation, eMASS. 
Each DON RMF step stands to benefit from automation. Leveraging current 
technologies available, Steps Two through Six could be partially automated, and Step One 
could be automated by creating a tool and a central repository that would ingest system 
categorizations and deliver recommended controls. Current technologies limit manual 
processes, but automation would assist in reducing the overall duration of the process. 
Already, NIST SP 800-53 lists hundreds of security controls, those are increasing, and only 
a subset of controls is applicable to each system. No cyber security expert is realistically 
expected to memorize the applicability and benefits of each; automation could help. 
Although the RMF KS contains baseline controls, it is not automated to assist the ISSE in 
the selection of required overlays and tailoring of systems. Automating here could prove 
especially valuable in optimizing the effectiveness, cost, and relevance of controls in the 
ever-changing system environments and threat settings. Absent these tools and capabilities, 
the Navy will likely find it impossible to obtain and maintain true cyber security within the 
ever-changing cyber threat environment and applicable mitigation measures. 
Several efforts exist to automate and accelerate the RMF process, such as C2C24, 
RAISED, and SECDEVOPS, but, unfortunately, many are disjointed and also present areas 
of vulnerabilities within critical mission systems as a result of U.S. Joint Staff 
Interoperability Requirements (SECNAV, 2019, p. 29). Interoperable systems should 
possess the ability to directly exchange services satisfactorily between them or their users 
(Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS], 2019). For example, RAISED is designed to automate and 
accelerate the RMF process within C2C24; however, it only works on CANES networks. 
Although these efforts lean forward, security is still often an afterthought despite the RMF 
process guide stating the opposite. To increase efficiency, security and risk management 
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must be incorporated from Step Zero: Prepare. Because reducing risks to an acceptable 
level remains the focal point of the RMF, automation would help provide a means to collect 
data metrics, observe progress, improve decisions, and yield a measurable process.  
Risk aggregation is an important step within the DON RMF necessary to fully 
assess and manage risks of our systems. According to the DON RMF Process Guide, the 
SCA is charged with quantifying and aggregating risk. However, both eMASS and the 
RMF KS are inadequate at facilitating the aggregation of risk via vulnerability chaining. 
Unfortunately, due to the current structure of the DON RMF and the lack of automated 
tools used to assist the SCA, risk aggregation is convoluted and, as a result, is often more 
an afterthought than the focal point. The SCA must utilize products produced throughout 
the other steps of the RMF process such as the SP, SAR, eMASS entries, and the KS to 
aggregate risk, resulting in tedious work influenced by personnel subjectivity. As long as 
the DON RMF remains qualitative in nature, it will not facilitate a way to aggregate risk, 
further substantiating the need for a standardized, more quantitative DON RMF. 
When something is broken, there are two options: fix or replace. eMASS either 
needs replacement by a system specifically designed to support the current RMF or repair 
of its several broken pieces. Originating from DIACAP, eMASS was created to support 
Information Assurance (IA) program management and has since been adapted and updated 
to support RMF, resulting in significant limitations. NIST SP 800-55 (2008) shows that the 
data from CCRI, CSICP, Penetration tests, and more is supposed to be used to support 
measurements and risk assessments, but eMASS is incapable of ingesting, processing, and 
correlating findings from these reports. In addition to the reports specifically called out in 
NIST SP 800-55, the RMF needs a tool capable of ingesting other forms of data that possess 
the potential to affect risk management decisions such as threat intelligence and tailored 
recommendations, as well as additional measurements such as culture, awareness, and 
training. 
F. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
Through step-by-step examination of the RMF process and its governing 
documents, our research demonstrates the need for a standardized approach to assessing 
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and measuring risk within the DON RMF. Key findings of the SECNAV Cybersecurity 
Readiness Review published in 2019 regarding issues within the DON’s culture, people, 
structure, processes, and resources also demonstrate this need. Overall, because the DON 
has yet to establish any uniform or effective metrics to quantify risk, and the current DON 
CS and RMF processes remain ambiguous, the Navy does not yet have the agility needed 
to operate in the current cyber threat environment (SECNAV, 2019). Because the Navy 
has a critical need for such agility in risk assessment, Chapter V offers detailed 




This thesis examined risk and risk assessment in detail to offer potential improvements 
to the Navy’s RMF process especially regarding information systems and Cyber Security. 
We reviewed the history of trying to ensure IA/CS, examined underpinnings of risk 
assessment, and explained how the A&A processes are currently designed. We also 
analyzed the current DON RMF processes, applying best practices and methods derived in 
the literature review, to assess current strengths and weaknesses. Chapter V summarizes 
our findings and offers recommendations—based both on our own operational experiences 
and this research—on how to improve the DON RMF practices. This chapter further offers 
a summary and three recommendations sections. As history shows, improvement of risk 
assessment processes is a continuous job, so we also conclude with suggestions for further 
research on the DON RMF or whatever replacement might follow. 
A. SUMMARY 
For quite a while, the DOD/DON has been playing catch up trying to address the 
exponentially increasing challenges that cyber security presents. While the current RMF 
approach improves upon its predecessors, it, too, needs an overhaul. Derived from NIST 
and DOD directives, the DON’s RMF process blindly inherits the ambiguity necessary for 
writing policy for a polyglot of organizations and fails to tailor the RMF to specific Navy 
organizational need and practices, despite the specific instruction to do so in the parent 
instruction. Additionally, the DON RMF is highly qualitative and lacks standardized 
definitions, measurements, metrics, and a risk assessment methodology. The current 
RMF’s qualitative approach is further complicated by the bias, heuristics, groupthink, 
inconsistency, overconfidence, and overestimation that can ensue from subjective inputs 
throughout the DON RMF. The DON needs a more quantitative RMF with standardized 
definitions, measurements, metrics, and better training to ensure appropriate risk mitigation 
and to provide continuous feedback for process improvement leading to increased 
cybersecurity and resiliency of naval networks. The following sections highlight the 
specific recommendations that may help the Navy accomplish that mission.  
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
As we considered translating our analysis into recommendations, one overarching 
thought occurred. Should the Navy simply abandon the RMF and start anew, or should the 
Navy try to improve the existing RMF? The first option offers the chance to start afresh 
with new procedures that would satisfy the current RMF’s many shortcomings. A new risk 
management framework might well include replacing the unwieldy eMASS product, 
improving the ease of data collection and employment, and reinforcing a more quantitative 
approach, yet the RMF is young by process standards. Organizations are only now 
becoming adept at understanding the procedures, and, because it is a new process, most 
participants understand that RMF has shortcomings. We, therefore, recommend option 
two, stay with the current RMF and make continuous improvements. As noted above, the 
Navy’s RMF still does not contain the tailoring dictated by the NIST and DOD instructions, 
so that the implementation of such continuous improvements needs to be a Navy focus. 
Additionally, our recommendations come in three groups, described in the following 
sections: 
• Get the basics right 
• Improve each RMF step  
• Address Navy-wide challenges that limit RMF 
1. Get the Basics Right 
We offer “getting the basics right” recommendations in three parts: standardizing 
definitions, establishing standard, and more quantitative, measurement methodology, and 
migrating from qualitative to quantitative risk matrices. 
Standardize Definitions 
To establish standardized definitions, we recommend DON CIO convene a working 
group; at a minimum, the Navy needs to define risk, uncertainty, measurement, and cyber 
resiliency. Additionally, the working group could consider defining other terms that result 
from our further recommendations. We specifically recommend that the group consider 
implementing the following definitions as a basis for the standards:  
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• Risk  
Consider and modify as needed this research’s definition of risk, derived from 
similar definitions used by Hubbard and Seiersen, (2016) and NIST “a 
measure of uncertainty to which the likelihood and/or impact of a threat, 
potential circumstance, or event may be expressed in quantitative terms.”  
• Uncertainty  
Adopt Hubbard and Seiersen (2016, p. 29)’s definition of uncertainty as “the 
lack of complete certainty, that is, the existence of more than one possibility. 
The ‘true’ outcome/state/result/value is not known.”  
• Measurement 
Again, adopt the proposed definition by Hubbard and Seiersen (2016, p. 21) 
of measurement as “a quantitatively expressed reduction of uncertainty based 
on one or more observations.”  
• Cyber Resiliency  
Employ this research’s definition of cyber resiliency, derived from similar 
definitions used by MITRE and NIST, as “an organization’s ability to predict, 
absorb, recover, and pivot from adversity in the cyber realm while continuing 
to fight.” 
Establish Standard Quantitative Measurement Methodology 
The DON RMF aims to reduce risk to an acceptable level, and deliberate 
measurements are, therefore, required. The words performance and measurement, or any 
reference to NIST SP-800-55, are rare within DoDI 8510.01 and the DON process guide. 
Additionally, no RMF documentation being used to determine the effectiveness of risk 
management throughout the life cycle of the system contains measurements. The absence 
of a standard measurement methodology and metrics contradicts the primary goal of RMF. 
Most successful Fortune 500 companies, contrastingly, do use and make available specific 
measurement metrics and technologies, and the Navy can leverage these to improve 
measurement within the DON RMF. 
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While we feel strongly that quantitative measuring is a must for a successful RMF 
program, we caution that organizations recognize that they “get what they measure.” If 
DON RMF institutes and executes new measures that do not align with the overall 
objective of superior operational cyber resiliency, but instead become an organizational 
burden of little value, i.e., just another “check the box” formality, then those are the wrong 
measures. DON will need to frequently review the usefulness of their new quantitative 
measures. We recommend convening a working group to:  
• Develop DON specific metrics to adequately track the current status and 
progress of our organization;  
• Coordinate with NIST to update and tailor NIST SP 800-55 to DOD RMF 
requirements; and  
• Expand upon this guidance by tailoring these measurements for application to 
the Navy’s operational environments. 
Foundationally, having the appropriate measurements in place would allow for the 
proper allocation and justification of resources and investments as needed, leading to a 










Table 1. Examples of Standard Quantified Measures 
Measure Unit Reasoning 
Number of controls implemented Count Controls add security; 
therefore, more controls 
should equal a more secure 
system.  
Number of controls modified or 
further tailored for additional 
requirements such as AOR, new 
threat intel, changes in enemy TTPs, 
et cetera 
Count Tracking required deviations 
to controls would demonstrate 
how the Navy is adjusting to 
threat intel and counter 
evolving adversary TTPs. 
Percentage of deficiencies identified 
in penetration testing 
Number of deficiencies/
Number of test elements 
This is one type of test that 
determines if the controls are 
effective. 
Average time to deploy system 
patches 
Hours to deploy patches/
Number of patches 
Keeping systems updated on 
patches is an important factor 
in maintaining security. 
Average time it takes a new threat 
intel bulletin to be shared 
throughout all Navy Organizations 
(PM, ISO, SYSCOMs, SCAs, et 
cetera) 
Hours to acknowledge new 
threat/New intel reported 
Threat intel sharing is an 
important factor in 
maintaining security across the 
Navy. 
 
Migrate from Qualitative to Quantitative Risk Matrices 
If the use of risk matrices must remain within the RMF process, careful 
considerations must be taken to account for as many of the matrices’ qualitative aspects as 
possible since risk matrices are particularly subject to bias, heuristics, and groupthink. We 
recommend the DON convene a working group of risk experts with quantitative risk 
assessment backgrounds to: 
• Investigate the specific usage of risk matrices within DON RMF.  
As a starting point, the quantitative working group should: 
• Leverage Louis Anthony Cox’s study, What’s Wrong with Risk Matrices 
(2008, pp. 501–506), where he developed three axioms and one rule to 
improve the quantification within risk matrices: the weak consistency axiom, 
between-ness axiom, consistent coloring axiom, and the three-color rule. 
Alternatively, the quantitative working group could research different methods that could 
replace or add value to risk matrices such as the Factor Analysis of Information Risk 
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(FAIR) (Hanes et al., 2017, pp. 262–266) and Intel’s Threat Agent Risk Assessment 
(TARA) (Rosenquist, 2012) methods. 
2. DON RMF Process 
 Deriving the DON RMF from the NIST RMF provides many advantages and allows 
the Navy to leverage the best practices and lessons learned from industry leaders and 
experts. However, our analysis demonstrates current shortfalls. The Navy should:  
• Foster and develop more involved partnerships with NIST to assist with better 
addressing more of the unique challenges faced by the Navy within 
Cybersecurity and RMF;  
• Revise internal DON processes to evaluate, adapt, and implement changes or 
updates made to NIST RMF policies that are applicable to the DON RMF 
process; and also 
• Work to streamline those processes.  
An updated, standardized, better defined, measurable, and more quantitative RMF 
would address many issues within the RMF process. The following sections identify 
specific improvement recommendations for each DON RMF process step.  
Step Zero – Prepare 
• Conduct a complete review of RMF documentation to ensure that it includes 
the most recent NIST updates and changes such as the prepare step outlined in 
NIST SP 800-37 (Revision 2).  
Step One – Categorize System  
The categorization step is inherently subjective, and its subjectivity impacts the 
remaining steps of the RMF process and budget allocation; therefore, brokering agreement 
on categorization between stakeholders and SMEs adds too much time to the process. 
Correct categorization of the system is crucial since it impacts all remaining RMF steps, 
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and errors here result in expensive rework. We recommend that one of the highest priorities 
in updating the DON RMF should be to: 
• Reduce the subjectivity of system categorization in one of the two following 
ways.  
Rather than developing categorizations based on what the acquisition community believes, 
mission stakeholders, including operators, maintainers, operational testers, and 
independent information security experts must be incorporated early in the RMF process 
to assist with the proper system categorization. Alternatively, consider making the 
categorization process independent of the stakeholders, run by a standing team of 
operational and RMF risk experts. 
Step Two – Select Security Controls 
Implementing automation in Step Two would improve the selection of security 
controls and help increase speed in the RMF process. Although the RMF KS is a good 
resource to consult in the selection of system security control and overlays, it is tedious, 
subjective, and inconsistent. A new or converted automated tool must be capable of data 
analysis to measure consistency among system categorization, security control selection, 
and ISSE history. Since the ISSE selects and implements the controls, a record of their 
history would reduce deviation and assist in removing subjective input errors. ISSE history 
would allow ISSEs to examine similar systems and look to improve security control 
selection and tailoring based on their previous experience combined with new threat 
intelligence. We recommend the Navy improve RMF Step Two in four ways: 
• Review and update the RMF KS, expanding beyond baseline controls to assist 
in overlay selection and tailoring to increase KS’s capacity to ingest 
observable data relative to security controls; 
• Develop an automated tool capable of utilizing a centralized repository for all 
security controls of systems and their effectiveness, which must assist in the 
selection of overlays and tailoring based off observable measurements of 
system;.  
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• Require the NQV to be present during controls selection rather than being 
consulted on an “as needed” basis; and 
• Establish performance metrics for the consistency of each ISSE, such as 
tracking each ISSE’s control and overlay selection history, tailoring decisions 
compared to the average, and/or amount of experience and number of 
programs. 
See Table 2 for examples of ISSE performance metrics. 
Table 2. Examples of ISSE Performance Metrics for Consistency 
Measure Unit Reasoning 
Percentage of similar or 
identical systems ISSE 
has implemented 
Number of same controls, 
overlays, and tailoring/
Number of similar or 
identical systems 
Security controls 
implemented by ISSEs 
should be consistent 
among similar or 
identical systems.  
Number of controls and 
overlays selected per 
system found to be Non-
Compliant, result in a 
vulnerability, or are 
improperly implemented 




observation would assist 
in determining whether 
an ISSE is improving or 
declining based on 
system type. 
Percentage of 
concurrence from other 
ISSEs working on similar 
or identical systems. 
Number of ISSEs concurring 
with control selection, 
overlays, tailoring/Number of 
similar or identical systems 
two or more ISSEs have 
worked on 
Consistency amongst 




of system controls. This 
measure can also assist 
in identifying 
overconfidence.  
Years of ISSE specific 
experience and # systems 
under purview 
Number of Years specific 
ISSE experience/Number of 
systems under purview 
Combined with measures 
above, how many years 
on average does it take 
to be a consistent and 
accurate ISSE? How 
many systems might that 
take on average? 
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Step Three – Implement Security Controls 
Our analysis demonstrated organizational changes that deviate from written 
guidance throughout the RMF, which must be addressed to reduce unnecessary risk due to 
confusing or contradicting governing documents. We offer two specific recommendations 
to better implement security controls:  
• When updating the DON RMF process guide, examine internal processes to 
remove organizational deviations that exist across current DON process; and  
• Review the current testing tools used within the DON, standardize testing 
tools across the DON, and expand, as necessary. Systems that cannot be 
scanned via DON-approved tools incur further risk and should not be 
permitted to proceed in the RMF process. 
Step Four – Assess Security Controls 
Subjective interpretation of the assessment of security control results form the basis 
from which SCAs recommend system authorization to the AO. As a crucial RMF process 
step, Step Four would greatly benefit from a standardized organizational quantitative risk 
methodology. The fact that validators, SCAs, and SCA liaisons have no specialized risk 
training yet are charged with assessing risk is alarming. Misinterpretation and inappropriate 
risk assignment within Step Four provides skewed data to the AO, who then has the 
potential to authorize a system with great risk to the Navy. To avoid such serious errors, 
we recommend that the Navy: 
• Require all validators, SCAs, and SCA liaisons to complete specialized risk 
training; 
• Identify how often vulnerabilities discovered in Step Four were not identified 
in Step Three, which may indicate either that testing tools are not sufficient or 
that training is lacking for test tool operations; and 
• Establish metrics that track the NQV, SCA, and SCA Liaison’s consistency in 
risk assessments throughout their career, such as amount of experience and 
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training as SCAs, vulnerabilities discovered in Step Four missed in Step 
Three, and bias statistics based on individual SCAs versus the average SCA 
performance. 
See Table 3 for examples of possible performance metrics for personnel 
consistency. 
Table 3. Examples of NQV, SCA Liaison, SCA Performance Metrics for 
Consistency 
Measure Unit Reasoning 
Percentage of similar or 
identical systems NQV, 
SCA Liaison, SCA have 
assessed. 
Number of systems assessed 
with different levels of risk/
Number of similar or 
identical systems assessed 
The NQV, SCA Liaison, 
SCA should consistently 
assess similar or 
identical systems with 
the same level of risk 
and reasoning. 
Percentage of 
concurrence from other 
NQV, SCA Liaison, SCA 
assessing similar or 
identical systems. 
 
Number of NQVs, SCA 
Liaison, SCA concurring 
with assessment of risk 
/Number of similar or 
identical systems 2 or more 
NQVs, SCA Liaisons, SCAs 
have assessed 
Consistency amongst 
NQVs, SCA Liaisons, 




of risk assessments.  
 
Percentage of systems 
NQV assesses that SCA 
Liaison or SCA are 
directly involved in risk 
assessment from the 
beginning. 
Number of systems NQV 
assesses with direct 
involvement from SCA 
Liaison or SCA in risk 
assessment from the 
beginning/Number of total 
systems NQV has assessed 
This measurement may 
help determine whether 
the NQV needs more or 
less assistance in 
assessing risk.  
 
Step Five – Authorize System 
Until the RMF update addresses the issues related to the previous steps, AOs will 
continue to face significant challenges. AOs need the most relevant and accurate picture of 
risk to make informed decisions. The Navy can measure all AOs for consistency 
throughout their career and for consistency compared to other Navy AOs. See Table 4 for 
examples of potential AO consistency metrics.  
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Table 4. Examples of AO Performance Metrics for Consistency 
Measure Unit Reasoning 
Percentage of instances an 
AO does not concur with 
SCA recommendation 
Number of systems AO did 
not concur with/Total 
number of systems reviewed 
by AO. 
This measure would 
provide insight as to how 
often AOs disagree with 
SCA recommendation 
and perhaps illuminate 
whether AOs are 
actually determining 
risk. 
Number of systems not 
approved by the AO 
Count This measure would 
provide insight as to how 
often specific AOs deny 
authorizations. 
Number of systems an 
AO authorized to operate 
with a waiver or 
extension 
Count This measure will help 
track the shift from 
compliance to 
effectiveness by being 
able to observe 
decreasing instances of 
waivers and waiver 
extensions specific to 
each AO. 
Number of systems 
approved by an AO which 
have been exploited 
Count This measure would 
allow specific tracking 
of systems approved by 
an AO which have been 
exploited and may 
require further 
examination.  
Percentage of similar or 
identical systems AO has 
authorized with varying 
risk levels 
Number of similar or 
identical systems authorized 
with varying risk levels 
/Number of similar or 
identical systems reviewed 
Consistency amongst 
AOs is required across 
Navy organizations. 
Deviations require 
additional examination.  
Percentage of 
concurrence from other 
AOs reviewing similar or 
identical systems. 
 
Number of AOs concurring 
with assessment of risk and 
decision/Number of similar 
or identical systems 2 or 
more AOs have assessed 
Consistency amongst 





We recommend the Navy establish additional metrics to document system waivers 
granted by AOs for those risks that do not meet the RMF requirements. We offer the 
following specific additional recommendations regarding AOs: 
• Establish minimum training, education, and experience requirements to serve 
as AO, including AO PQS; 
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• Consider a pay bonus for qualifying as an AO; 
• Recruit, train, or appoint specialized risk experts for consultation by AOs;  
• Establish metrics for tracking AO consistency; and 
• Create a tool that tracks the number of waivers and extensions for waivers 
issued, including notes on the AO’s justification for the waiver and proposed 
operational workarounds.  
One model for such a tool is the Navy surface warfare combat system capabilities and 
limitations secure website, which lists the results of every system test, identifies trouble 
reports, and offers tactical workarounds. This site is responsible for increasing warfighting 
resilience. 
Step Six – Monitor Security Controls 
DON RMF Step Six lacks clear definition and specific guidance and is actually not 
implemented in but rather after the DON RMF process, yet this continuous monitoring is 
intended for reassessments as needed throughout a system’s life cycle. Implementing Step 
Six requires the integration of a system’s history including the original RMF package, 
inspections such as CSICP, CCORI, and penetration testing, and threat intelligence reports 
in one virtual location so that the SCA, AO, and senior leadership can execute continuous 
monitoring. To do so more effectively, we recommend that the Navy: 
• Define and standardize continuous monitoring and continuous reassessment; 
• Leverage automation, analysis, and data collection into a virtual RMF 
workplace available to the SCA and AO; and 
• Develop a dashboard that is accessible to the commanding officers and system 
operators that allows for near-real time network status, analysis, and 
monitoring. 
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3. Navy-Wide Challenges that Limit RMF 
The SECNAV report highlights issues with culture, people, structure, process, and 
resource challenges in CS today. Our analysis applied those issues directly to the DON 
RMF. Recommendations for decreasing the impact of those issues follow. 
Culture 
The DON needs a cultural shift from episodic compliance to continuous cyber 
warfighting effectiveness. Doing so will require changes in accountability, incentive, 
invention, and measured competency.  
• Accountability must be present from the most senior officials down to new 
accessions, and everyone must be held accountable for their actions.  
• Incentivizing our commanders and people should involve recognition and 
reward for exceeding the expectations of cyber security and resiliency, not for 
achieving the bare minimum.  
• Creative thinking, through innovation and adaptation of new technologies, 
will incentivize our Sailors to do better things rather than being stuck in the 
mindset of “this is how it has always been done.” 
• Measured competency applies to both commanders as well as subordinate 
personnel. At a minimum, if a commander is evaluated on their proficiency 
with damage control, maintenance, and warfighting, for example, there should 
also be a proficiency score associated with cyber security with the same 
expected of subordinate personnel on both the officer and enlisted side. The 
days of clicking through the same old cyber awareness course on NKO need 
to disappear. We need a more robust approach to measuring the understanding 
of cybersecurity within our force. This could be accomplished via observation, 
yearly proficiency testing, email tests to address spear phishing and other 
tactics.  
78 
• More robust training should be included in every Navy accession source and 
should be required for promotion and advancement. 
Leading cultural change is easier said than done. In order to affect a change 
throughout the fleet, a sound plan must be developed, implemented, and continuously 
evaluated for improvement. Numerous authors have developed methodologies for leading 
changes throughout organizations. One approach recommended by the authors is John 
Kotter’s methodology for Leading Change and his Eight Steps to Accelerate Change in 
Your Organization (Kotter, 2018). 
People 
People are the DON’s greatest asset and sometimes its biggest liability. Military, 
DOD civilian, and contractors alike need to be properly trained on RMF, cyber security, 
and resiliency, and on how such impacts the organization as a whole. The SECNAV 
Cybersecurity Readiness Review (2019) proposed the Identify-Recruit-Train-Sustain-
Retain model to assist with the many people-issues present throughout the fleet. Based on 
this study, and our own operational warfighting experience, we recommend the Navy: 
• Consult with the best and brightest risk experts in the private sector. These 
bright minds should be leveraged by the DON CIO appointed working groups 
identified in these recommendations. Use them to assist in developing a 
standardized quantitative methodology and approach to risk assessments. 
Have them develop a series of standardized DOD and DON certifications that 
prepare and support our risk assessors to execute their duties;  
• Develop a formally accredited and rigorous process for DON risk 
certification. The DON needs individuals who are thoroughly familiar with 
assessing risk and can assist in addressing the needed improvements for RMF. 
Develop risk certifications for RMF personnel that meet similar standards for 
risk assessors in the insurance, financial, and safety fields; 
• Research expanding the CTN ratings to employ them at the most tactical and 
operational levels within naval networks, since most ITs are not trained to 
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monitor the network and the RMF or to fight the ship through a cyber-attack; 
and, 
• Alternatively, overhaul IT training to include RMF, continuous monitoring, 
and fighting of naval networks since there are far more ITs than CTNs.  
IT training was overhauled several years ago with spectacular results, using software from 
Acuitus (S. Miller, personal communication, May 6, 2020). However, that overhaul was 
abandoned because of shortsighted cost avoidance by NETC (S. Miller, personal 
communication, May 6, 2020). Consider reimplementing that approach for IT “A” school. 
Organizational Structure 
Thorough examination of the current DON RMF process and RMF leadership 
structure identified a convoluted and fragmented organizational structure that inhibits 
effective execution of RMF. The DON CIO should be a full-time and dedicated 
individual—with proper authority, responsibility, and accountability—who reports directly 
to SECNAV. We also recommend that the DON appoint a Chief Information Risk Officer 
(CIRO) who is subordinate to the CIO and is the delegated authority of the DON RMF. 
The CIRO should ideally come from private industry and have ample experience dealing 
with risk in various organizations. The CIRO should lead a consolidated revamping of 
DON RMF in conjunction with the CIO. 
Process 
The existence of so many stove-piped organizational structures, as well as 
classification and interoperability complications throughout the fleet, other Services, and 
Agencies plague the DOD and inhibit proper sharing of intelligence and information. That 
plague also negatively impacts the DON RMF. Better intelligence and information sharing 
would lead to improved threat and vulnerability characterization in the RMF’s early stages 
of development, throughout the process, and during continuous monitoring through system 
life cycles. 
The DON must decide on a definitive way forward to address the lack of 
intelligence sharing whether it is JIE, JEDI, or something else. Until accurate and real time 
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threat assessments and capabilities are incorporated into the RMF process, risk estimates 
will ultimately be merely a snapshot in time at best. Systems are operated in several AORs, 
and security controls implemented need to be tailored appropriately according to the TTPs 
of each respective AOR’s adversaries. Absent this capability, RMF will remain 
insufficient. 
RMF Resources 
 Finally, and crucially, if truly interested in cyber warfare proficiency and 
resiliency: 
• The Navy must increase resources devoted to this warfighting goal.  
For example, each step within the DON RMF process stands to benefit from automation. 
Leveraging current available technologies, Steps Two through Six can be partially 
automated and Step One could be automated upon creation of a centralized repository of 
system categorizations with ingest capabilities. We also recommend: 
• Because risk aggregation remains a convoluted and resource intensive task, 
modify or replace the RMF KS and eMASS tools so that they: 
• Possess the capability to ingest reports produced throughout the RMF 
process, other third-party inspections like CSICP, CCORI, and penetration 
testing, as well as threat intelligence affecting cyber systems and  
• Support risk aggregation in support of cyber resiliency. 
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
Many questions remained unanswered for migrating from compliance to 
operational effectiveness. Future researchers might consider RMF studies in the following 
areas: 
• Establishing and using CYBER Figure of Merit;  
• Using the Cyber Range in support of system, unit, and force training; 
• Exploring how a platform becomes cyber resilient; 
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• Researching how to migrate from a firewall-based security at NOCs to 
individual-based security;  
• Because true cyber resiliency implies a highly educated crew, identifying 
ways to accelerate learning so that cyber defenders can become experts; 
• Studying whether risk matrices and their usage within the Navy have 
improved risk-based decisions or reduced risk; 
• Studying alternate risk methodologies to supplement or replace the use of risk 
matrices such as the FAIR and TARA methods; 
• Designing a new KS capable of ingesting observable data relative to security 
controls; and 
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